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ABSTRACT
COMPULSORY INTEREST ARBITRATION IN PUBLIC EDUCATION:
A CASE STUDY
by
Madeline Mary Keri
Chairman:

William P. Foster, Ed.D.

Resolution of impasse disputes in public sector
education has emerged as a growing concern in recent
years.

The purpose of this study was to determine if the

use of compulsory final offer interest arbitration has
served as a viable means of resolving conflicts between
boards of education and teacher associations in
Connecticut.
Statistical examination of the ways in which
contracts were settled, the types of issues arbitrated and
the decisions of the arbitrator(s) was conducted on the
182 arbitration awards made between 1979-80 and 1984-85 in
Connecticut.

Additionally, interviews were conducted with

members of the Department of Education's arbitration panel
and other individuals involved in the process in
Connecticut.

Of the 23 areas of issues for arbitration it

was found that salary, workday/year, medical insurance,
and leaves of absence were the most frequently arbitrated
issues when comparisons were done between areas.
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the area of arbitral decisions it was found that
arbitrators tend to be more favorable toward the
association when deciding issues pertaining to salary and
more favorable toward the board when deciding issues
pertaining to workday/year.

No other significant

differences were found.
Additionally, the results of arbitrator interviews
show that for the most part the process has worked well in
Connecticut and that parties are generally in acceptance
of compulsory arbitration for the resolution of contract
disputes.
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Chapter 1
Statement of the Issue

The following piece of research is a descriptive
study that examined the state of Connecticut in which
compulsory final offer interest arbitration (hereinafter
referred to as compulsory arbitration) is part of the
collective bargaining statute for public school teachers.
It examined the six years 1979-80 through 1984-85
following legislation calling for compulsory arbitration's
enactment in Connecticut, and looked at the outcomes,
both anticipated and unanticipated that have resulted.
By examining the brief history of compulsory arbitration
in public education, this study endeavored to determine if
legislated compulsory arbitration fosters collective
bargaining in public education by serving as a satisfactory
means for resolving impasse disputes.

The study also sought

to determine if any trends could be distinguished for the
future of compulsory arbitration in the collective
bargaining process for America's public school teachers.

1
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2
Significance of the Problem

In the collective bargaining process, parties are
frequently unable to come to an agreement on the terms
of a contract.

Often, when an agreement cannot be

reached the strike has been used as a means of dealing
with impasse disputes between employer and employees in
public education.

Unfortunately, the strike can mean a

loss of school days and a disruption to the educational
process, loss of financial support through decreased
subsidies and state allocations, and often create an
outcry of public dissatisfaction with the bargaining
parties.

It was important to determine if there was a

more appropriate way of dealing with impasse disputes,
especially at a time when many states were redefining and
amending their collective bargaining laws for public
school teachers.
The purpose of this case study was twofold.
First, it provided statistical data on how the compulsory
arbitration process had been utilized by the bargaining
parties.

It delved into the number of issues taken to

impasse under the legislation, the frequency with which
parties had reached a settlement without the use of any
impasse procedure, how often parties had settled at a
preliminary step in the impasse procedure, patterns of
usage of the procedure, issues most frequently arbitrated,

¥
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arbitrator rulings and the relationship of those
arbitral rulings to the category of issue being
arbitrated.
Secondly, by using the interviewing process the
study examined the perceptions of people who were
involved in the compulsory arbitration process and
looked at their satisfaction or dissatisfaction with
the procedure in Connecticut.
In choosing a case study approach, the researcher
was able to glean information that would be of value
to state legislatures that were revising or enacting
collective bargaining legislation for public school
teachers.

This case study also attempted to answer

the questions of many administrators and union
representatives who were unfamiliar with the use and
value of compulsory arbitration in the public education
arena.

The study enabled an interested individual

to look at how the compulsory arbitration process has
worked by making available both the statistical data
and the perceptions of levels of satisfaction demonstrated
by the groups and individuals involved in the process in
Connecticut.
By using a case study approach the researcher was
able to examine an entire state, including both
metropolitan and rural areas, while maintaining feasible
amounts of data to be analyzed.

Also, since this study was

f r ---------------Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

4
to provide information for other state legislatures the
inclusion of information on a statewide basis provided a
total picture of how the process has worked.

For this

reason the researcher felt that a macro approach was
of more value than a micro examination of a few
specific cases of compulsory arbitration.
In choosing the state of Connecticut, the
researcher first noted that this particular state's
legislation was the most recent, while still providing a
time span of six years usage.

In this way the study would

account for any responses that may have been attributed
to the initiation of a new system.

In addition, since

Connecticut's legislation is recent it is more relevant
to the changes now taking place in collective bargaining
in the United States.
A second reason for choosing Connecticut is the
state's use of a specific panel of arbitrators for
interest

arbitration hearings.

This contrasts to states

in which

arbitrators are chosen from a listing of all

possible

arbitrators within the state.

This factor

allowed for a more detailed analysis of the arbitration
panel itself, since its members had heard more than
or two cases over the six year period.

F
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5
Definition of Terms

1.

advisory interest arbitration - Interest

arbitration which is counseling, gives suggestions, or
is advising, but not imperative or conclusive.
2.

arbitrator - A private, disinterested person chosen

by the parties to a disputed question, for the purpose
of hearing their contention, and giving judgement
between them, to whose decision [award] the litigants
[parties] submit themselves either voluntarily, or in
some cases compulsory.
3.

collective bargaining - A procedure in which the

employer and employee representative bargain for the
wages, hours, and other conditions of employment for the
employee groups.
4.

compulsory final-offer interest arbitration - (in

the text shortened to compulsory arbitration) Arbitration of the terms of a contract which is
conclusive and which takes place where the consent of
one of the parties is enforced by statutory provisions.
The arbitrator/arbitrators shall resolve separately each
individual issue disputed by accepting the last best offer
of either of the parties and are not permitted to
compromise between the positions of the parties.
5.

factfinding - The act of a third person determining

a fact at issue between two parties in order to promote
resolution of the issue at impasse.

¥
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6.

final package - An award in which the arbitrator

chooses the entire proposal of one side or the other.
7.

impasse - A stalemate between parties concerning

the

issues at dispute.

8.

mediation - The act of a third person who

interferes between two contending parties with a view
to reconcile them or persuade them to adjust or settle
their dispute.
9.

statute - An act of the legislature declaring,

commanding or prohibiting something; the written will of
the

legislature, solemnly expressed according to the

forms necessary to constitute it the law of the state.
10.

stipulated agreement - An agreement reached by the

parties after an arbitration hearing has commenced.
11.

voluntary arbitration - Arbitration depending on or

arising from the mutual agreement of the parties.

F
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Chapter 2
Review of the Literature

Historical Background

Dunham (1976) notes that the earliest instance of
interest arbitration in the United States probably
occurred in 1786 between the seamen and their employers
in New York City, the purpose being to establish the
wages of the seamen (Mote, 1916).

The practice of using

interest arbitration as a means of solving disputes in
the private sector continued to grow following the
seamen's incident, and was recorded in settlements in
the steel, mining and railroad industries in the late
1880's.

This practice eventually moved into the transit

industry and at the turn of the century transit unions
began to arbitrate the terms [interests] of new
collective bargaining agreements (Kuhn, 1952? Dennis and
Somers, 1973).

Between 1900 and 1949 over 600 wage

cases were arbitrated; in the second half of this
century the use of interest arbitration to determine the
wages and other conditions of employment continues to
flourish in the local transit industry.

Similarly, the

7
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first International Arbitration Agreement in the
printing industry (Dennis and Somers, 1973) and
agreements in the foundry and machinist industries
utilizing interest arbitration were initiated during the
early part of this century.
The United States' most pervasive experience with
compulsory arbitration in the private sector is pointed
out by Morris (1976) as being the creation of the first
National War Labor Board in 1918 during World War I.
Although the Board was to provide mediation and
conciliation, it intervened directly in the
establishment of substantive conditions and thus
represented a form of interest arbitration.

A second

National War Labor Board was established with a similar
purpose during World War II.

Most of the 20,000 labor

disputes determined during this Board's existence were
impasses over the terms [interests] of collective
bargaining agreements.
Following World War II the use of interest
arbitration continued to expand with ten states
establishing laws which provided for compulsory
arbitration in certain vital services, primarily public
utilites (Bernstein, 1947).

It is significant to note

that in 1947 there was very little state legislation
concerned with mediation and arbitration outside of the
public utility area.

F
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states intended to reduce the number of strikes in the
larger field by weakening the bargaining power of trade
unions.

However, after about five years of extensive

usage, these laws ceased to be of importance because of
a 1951 Supreme Court ruling in Wisconsin decreeing that
the subject matter in the aforementioned laws was
preempted by the National Labor Relations Act.
Here it is important to make a distinction between
interest arbitration in the private sector, and interest
arbitration in the public sector, the latter of which is
detailed in this study.

Prasow and Peters (1983) point

out that in the private sector, impasses over interest
issues are not covered by statute and are ultimately
resolved by a balancing of the strengths by the parties'
(p. 311).

"In the public sector, however, where an

economic contest is, in most jurisdictions legally ruled
out by bounds, the parties often seek a resolution of
interest issues by resorting to fact finding or
arbitration" (p.313).

While the private sector's

industrial relations are regulated almost entirely under
the Labor Management Relations Act of 1970, and the
Railway Labor Act of 1970, which are federal statutes,
the public sector is regulated by individual state
statutes and in some cases by the ordinances of
municipalities, each of which are specific in their
definitions of coverage.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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In the United States during the past 40 years the
ever increasing number of organized public employees has
made it necessary for state legislatures to include
collective bargaining statutes, many of which include
provisions for some form of interest arbitration, into
the states' legal framework.

Chauhan (1979) has noted

that during the past 20 years state legislation
governing public labor relations has proliferated with
more than 2/3 of the states adopting formal collective
bargaining policies.

Horton (1975), Cocoran and Kutell

(1978), and Compton-Forbes (1984) are others who have
made reference to the large number of states which have
enacted collective bargaining legislation for public
employees in recent years.
Although the Arbitration Act of 1888 is generally
considered the first federal labor law, Horton (1975)
relates that as late as 1968 there was only one public
employee relations statute providing for the use of
interest arbitration.

Dunham (1976) found that in the

five year period from 1970-1975, sixteen states had
amended or enacted major legislation for public
employees.

Four of those states utilized compulsory

arbitration, six permitted strikes, four included fact
finding as a final step, one had combination arbitration
and right to strike, and one left impasse procedures at
the discretion of the Board while it forbade strikes.

if
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These changes in legislation continued and by 1976 at
least 20 states had formally placed the final
responsibility for resolving collective bargaining
disputes on arbitrators (Horton, 1975).
Outside of the United States, Canada and Australia
have had extensive experience with compulsory
arbitration in the public sector.

In Australia,

Commonwealth employees have had access to arbitration
procedures since 1911, and for years bargaining parties
had relied on the arbitration procedure instead of
attempting to negotiate their contracts collectively.
After 1965 the use of the strike became a more common
practice for dealing with impasses in Australia because
of changes that had been made in the criteria for
determining arbitration awards and due to a basic
deterioration in the unions' handling of the arbitration
procedure.

Still, the arbitration procedure has endured

for over 50 years in Australia and even with its flaws
has been preferred to other means of settling disputes
(McAvoy, 1972).
On the other hand, Canadian federal workers first
began to bargain in 1967 with the passage of the Public
Service Staff Relations Act (PSSRA) which covered all
federal employees and today represents more than 250,000
employees in 100 bargaining units (Ponak and Wheeler,
1980).

Under the Canadian statute a bargaining agent

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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may elect to use compulsory arbitration, but must
forfeit the unit's right to strike.
Compulsory arbitration has frequently been
challenged on its legal grounds in America's courtrooms
in its quest to achieve contract equity.

Houseman

(1973) points out that the main constitutional hurdle
concerning compulsory arbitration has involved the
question of whether the elected representatives of the
people should be able to delegate to others the exercise
of authority conferred upon them by law.
During the late 1800's cases concerning compulsory
arbitrations' constitutionality in the public sector
were already beginning to surface.

In Mann v.

Richardson, 1873, the question of whether public
officials had the right to submit discretionary matters
to arbitrators first arose.

In this case the court

found that a dispute between the commissioner of
highways and a homeowner over the price of the latter's
home could not go to arbitration and therefore bind the
town.

The Circuit Court of Illinois in discussing the

status of the public official said, "Where the law
imposes a personal duty upon an officer in relation to a
matter of public interest, he cannot delegate it to
others, and therefore, such officer cannot submit such
matters to arbitration."
It was years later, in 1951, that the first

F
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favorable decision of major proportions concerning
compulsory arbitration in the public sector was decided
by the Supreme Court of Errors in Connecticut in Norwalk
Teachers Association v* Board of Education.

The court

was posed with the question of whether under Connecticut
law arbitration was a permissible method to settle or
adjust disputes between the plaintiff and the defendant.
The court held that:

(1) Teachers had the right to

organize and bargain over pay and conditions of
employment (2) A Board of Education could enter into a
contract which required grievance arbitration (3)
Mediation of disagreements was permissible (4) Teachers
could not engage in concerted activities such as work
stoppages and strikes and (5) Boards of Education could
not surrender any of their legal policy making
discretion to the bargaining process.
In recent years the constitutionality of many other
compulsory arbitration laws has been challenged in
various states.

In 1979 Chauhan compiled a listing of

18 states in which the laws had already been challenged.
He found that the compulsory arbitration statutes had
been upheld by the highest state courts in
Massachusetts, Minnesota, Washington, New York,
Nebraska, Rhode Island, Pennsylvania, Wyoming, Wisconsin
and Oregon.

The highest state courts had declared the

laws unconstitutional in California, Colorado, Utah and

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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South Dakota, while the Supreme Courts of Maine and
Michigan reached deadlocks which therefore left
favorable lower court decisions in effect.
be found in Chauhan at page 37).

(Table I to

In general, it was

found that the courts tend to uphold state statutes
which provide for compulsory arbitration in the public
sector when the statutes are applied to serve the public
interest.
In the public sector, the use of compulsory
arbitration as a means of settling impasse disputes has
increased in recent years with various authors examining
the effectiveness, benefits, and cause and effects of
its inclusion into the collective bargaining process.
The next segment of the review of the literature will
address those different areas of interest in regard to
compulsory arbitration and will present some of the
changes that are now taking place in collective
bargaining in America's public sector.

Compulsory Arbitration's Effectiveness as a Final Step
in Impasse

Initial review of the literature in collective
bargaining shows that compulsory arbitration has been
found to be a more appropriate final step for settling
impasse disputes in contract negotiations (Dunham, 1976;

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Gallagher, 1982).
Dunham (1976) in an examination of public employee
bargaining found the preliminary impasse procedure of
factfinding to be analogous with advisory arbitration in
which bargaining parties are only advised and not bound
by the law to abide by the arbitrator's recommendations.
He noted that after a few years of factfinding as the
final step in impasse, the union tends to become
stronger with the resulting consequence being illegal
strikes.

In his research, Dunham sent questionnaires to

20 states and the City of New York, all of which were
known to have an administrative agency responsible for
the public employee collective bargaining law.
Information sufficient for inclusion in his study was
obtained from 14 states and New York City.
After analysis of the data Dunham concluded that
(1) Three of four states that had used factfinding for
six or more years had the highest incidence of strikes
(2) compulsory arbitration was utilized more often than
factfinding as the final step of impasse (3) strikes
seem to occur less frequently when compulsory
arbitration rather than factfinding is the final step in
impasse and (4) strikes occur approximately five times
as often if they are legal than if they are illegal.
Feuille (1977) in his studies on the effectiveness
of the compulsory arbitration experience of police and

F -------------
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firefighters in Eugene, Oregon for the years 1971-76
concluded that in Eugene unions and management operating
under a compulsory arbitration procedure can reduce
their use of the procedure as they become familiar with
it.

Feuille examined the 12 sets of negotiations under

the compulsory arbitration procedure during the five
years investigated.

In nine cases the parties were able

to reach their own agreement on all issues while in two
other cases the parties decreased reliance on all items
with only one issue being taken to arbitration in each
case.

Feuille noted that in the last six negotiations

no arbitration awards were issued (three in 1974-75 and
three in 1975-76) with the parties reaching an agreement
on their own without the help of a neutral third party.
Feuille suggests that over time the compulsory
arbitration procedure has become more rather than less
effective in preserving the parties' incentives to reach
their own agreements.

It may be difficult to pinpoint

the precise reasons for this phenomena but the author
notes some possible reasons as being:

(1) Early union

losses and the desire to avoid repetitions (2) The
speedy arbitration time table (3) The total package
selection requirement (4) The absence of impasse steps
between negotiations and arbitration (5) Arbitrator
encouragement of negotiations after the procedure has
been invoked and (6) An early final-offer submission

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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deadline (five days prior to the arbitration process).
Gallagher and Pegnetter (1979) in their research
evaluated the effectiveness of impasse procedures by
examining data from the Iowa Public Employment Relations
Act, a three step statutory procedure which uses
mediation, factfinding and arbitration on an issue by
issue basis.
During its first year in use 74% of all public
employee contracts were under the new three step
procedure.

All remaining contracts from that time

period were to be decided upon by the parties, with the
parties using a mutually agreed upon impasse procedure
other than the process required under the new statute.
To measure effectiveness of the three step process
the authors first examined the number of impasses
settled at each step of the procedure.

Their results

show a strong "filtering effect" as the level of
uncertainty and the neutral's power increased.

During

the first year 154 (61.4%) negotiations utilized
mediation, 113 (73.4%) of those impasses were settled
and 41 proceeded to factfinding.

Thirty-two of the

remaining impasses (20.8%) were resolved in factfinding
and only nine (5.8%) proceeded onto arbitration.

Those

nine arbitration cases represented only 3.6% of all
contract negotiations during the statute's first year.
In the law's second year in use 44.7% of the

F
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negotiations requested mediation with 8.8% of the
impasses reaching the final step of arbitration.

Again,

less than 4% (3.9%) of all contract negotiations ended
in arbitration.
These percentages for arbitration usage are low
when compared with other states in which the percentage
of negotiations going to arbitration ranged from 10.4%
in Wisconsin (1973-74), to 16.3% in Michigan (1973-76),
to 30.1% in Pennsylvania (1969-74) and finally 55% in
city government in Eugene, Oregon.

Although these

percentages are higher than those in Iowa it should be
noted that the previous data requires careful
interpretation due to statutory differences in the
states and municipalities mentioned.
Gallagher and Pegnetter did deduce that a large
difference in the propensity to use arbitration appears
to be related to the factfinding step.

If the parties

negotiated an independent procedure in which the
factfinding step was eliminated, the tendency for the
bargaining relationship to use arbitration increased
tremendously.

They also found that there was a

significant difference in the number of issues taken to
arbitration after factfinding (3.9 issues) when compared
with the number of issues taken to arbitration when
factfinding was not included in the procedure (6.2
issues).

F
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During the first two years of negotiations 13.95%
of the parties utilized arbitration when factfinding was
eliminated while 3.8% used arbitration under the
statutory procedure when factfinding was the second step
in the three tier process.

This was found to be very

high with county and state units in which 47.7% went to
arbitration when factfinding was eliminated while only
3.9% of the county and state units utilized arbitration
when factfinding was retained.

This may be an

indication that the parties are unwilling to forego the
costs of arbitration when in all probability the
arbitrator will choose the factfinder's recommendation,
a viable deduction since in this study the factfinder
recommendation served in part as a basis for settlements
in 54% of all issues brought to arbitration.
The authors' findings also indicate that: (1) The
procedure generally increases pressure on the parties to
settle (2) Reliance on the procedure does not seem too
high and (3) Factfinding reduces the number of issues
taken to arbitration.
Gallagher and Chaubey (1982) also investigated the
impasse procedure used under the Iowa Public Employment
Relations Act, examining its first five years (1975-76
through 1979-80) of use.

Their analyses focused on

determining if bargaining representatives employ
different post-factfinding position modification

W

'
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strategies in accordance with the factfinder's
recommendations.
Their sample included 271 disputes (school and
municipal and county governments) which utilized
mediation and factfinding.

Eighty-five or 31% of the

disputes, representing 5% of all contract negotiations
during that period, advanced to compulsory arbitration.
Due to an absence of the factfinder's or arbitrator's
report 76 of the 85 cases, or 89% of the case population
was used in the study.

Of these parties seven had gone

to arbitration at least twice during the five year
period examined.
In the 76 cases examined 257 issues (3.4 per case
average) were arbitrated.

Neither party modified their

position on 64.2% of the issues and for 34.6% of the
issues a compromise settlement was recommended.

Those

compromises in turn constituted the largest portion of
recommendations within cases.
Joint position modification was found to be
substantially higher in single issue cases than in
multiple issue cases.

These findings relate to the

expectation that position modification is associated
with compromise recommendations.

This is in line with

Long and Feuille's (1974) observation that disputed
issues of an "either-or" variety effect the extent of
the parties' position modification.

F
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to note that when a party submitted a final offer
identical to the factfinder recommendations that
position had a very high probability of being selected
by the arbitrator.
In their conclusions Gallagher and Chaubey found
that:

(1) Parties advancing their disputes from

factfinding to arbitration engage in only limited
position modification between the two steps and (2)
Arbitrators are likely to reaffirm the impasse
resolutions recommended by the factfinder.

The authors

also point out some key liabilities of the Iowa
procedure that were evidenced by their findings.

(1)

That parties' behaviors may be influenced by the
perceived predictability of the arbitrator's awards
given the factfinder recommendations;

(2) parties'

strategies in submitting final offers may differ
depending on the importance of the issues;

(3) there is

a reluctance on the part of the arbitrator to override
the factfinder's recommendations; and, (4) shifts occur
in the locus of decision making from the arbitration to
the factfinding step.

T he U se o f C o m p u ls o ry A r b i t r a t i o n

a s an In c e n tiv e

to

B a rg a in

Stern, Rehmus, Lowenberg, Kasper and Dennis (1975)

F
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and Gallagher (1978) are a few who maintain that the
primary rationale behind compulsory arbitration is one
in which the parties are afraid to lose completely and
therefore are compelled to give a more reasonable
proposal for consideration.

Stern et al. (1975) support

the premise that compulsory arbitration exerts a
centripetal force on the parties to move toward a center
ground.

They go on to state that:

One of the claimed advantages of finaloffer-by package [compulsory] arbitration over
conventional arbitration is that the parties
know that they may be penalized heavily if they
do not formulate realistic positions.
Theoretically, the parties will reach
settlements more often under such a system and
in cases where agreement is not reached, they
will be closer together so that the arbitrator
will have less room for error (p. 184).
Gallagher (1978) initiated research that examined
the first two years (1975-77) of impasse procedures
under the Iowa Public Employment Relations Act.

The two

questions he explored were (1) Whether including the
factfinder report at arbitration encourages the union
and the employer to move closer to the factfinder's
recommendation when proceeding from factfinding to
compulsory arbitration and (2) to what extent and under

F
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What conditions are arbitrators in Iowa public sector
disputes likely to select the factfinder's
recommendations from among the three alternative
positions available:

(1) employer offer (2) union offer

and (3) factfinder recommendation?
During the first two years under the Iowa statute
96 negotiations utilized factfinding.

Sixty-nine

impasses were resolved in factfinding while 27 proceeded
to arbitration.

The data utilized in Gallagher's study

involved 25 of the 27 cases (2 were excluded because of
an absent or unclear report) that went to arbitration.
The 25 cases examined included 12 cases dealing with
municipal services, 10 educational disputes and one
county labor-management dispute.
The 25 cases covered a total of 77 issues in
dispute.

Of the 77 issues that advanced from

factfinding to arbitration the factfinder recommended
accepting either the union (15) or the employer's (29)
position for a total of 44 issues.

In the 33 remaining

issues the factfinder encouraged settlement with a
position different from those presented by either the
union or employer at factfinding.
Those 33 issues were analyzed to determine the
impact of the factfinder's recommendation on the
propensity of the union and employer to modify their
positions before arbitration.

Gallagher found that
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arbitrators have a strong tendency to accept the
factfinder's recommendations.
also found to exists

The following trends were

(1) there is a tendency for

arbitrators to select factfinder's recommendations that
for most issues lie somewhere between the union's and
the employer's final offers; (2) the arbitrators show a
tendency to accept the final offers of the party whose
factfinding position received the factfinder's
endorsement; and, (3) in multiple issue cases
arbitrators generally selected those positions that lie
closest to the factfinder's recommendation.
The findings also show that factfinding reports
included both unilateral and bilateral movement by the
parties except in cases where the factfinder is in
agreement with one of the parties, in which case there
was limited movement in either parties' bargaining
position.
Weitzman and Stochaj's (1980) research analyzed the
results of a survey regarding New Jersey's Chapter 85 of
the Public Laws of 1977, commonly known as the Fire and
Police Arbitration Act.

Their survey was submitted to

18 members of an appointed arbitration panel who had
heard a majority of the dispute cases occurring during
the first two years under the Act.

Sixteen of those

arbitrators were eventually interviewed.
The authors first looked at the usage rates of
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various impasse procedures under the new statute noting
that in fiscal year 1978 there were 210 petitions to
initiate compulsory arbitration with the arbitrator
making the final economic decision in 67 cases.

The

decisions were in favor of the union 41 times and the
employer 26 times.

In fiscal year 1979 there was a

slight increase and 221 petitions for arbitration were
filed.

During 1979 the arbitrator decided in favor of

the union 15 times and the employer 18 times with
additional cases pending, a situation that made it
impossible to make any ratio comparisons between
bargaining parties for the two years studied.
The second section of the survey included
subsections of questions covering areas such as
knowledge, preparation and representation of the
parties, and certain criteria that arbitrators rely upon
when rendering their decisions.

The following trends

were evidenced in the survey responses.

(1) Arbitrators

felt that the parties awareness of the arbitration
process varies from "little" to "well informed" with
awareness improving for both parties in the second year
(2) In every case, arbitrators attempted to mediate
disputes between parties.

Parties reached an agreement

in 1/3 of the cases and the mediation/arbitration
approach resolved some of the issues at impasse in the
remaining cases (3) Three-fourths of those surveyed felt
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that comparability with similar bargaining groups was
the major criteria used to decide cases (4) Two-thirds
of the respondents preferred conventional arbitration
over compulsory arbitration because it gave the neutral
third party more discretion and the ability to
compromise differences and (5) Most arbitrators still
note to date that compulsory arbitration as compared
with conventional arbitration can increase the
probability of reaching negotiated settlements by
exerting a centripetal force on the parties to move
toward a center ground, an observation confirmed by
others (Stern et al., 1975; Holden, 1976; ComptonForbes, 1984).
Bacharach and Lawler's (1981) behavioral theory of
bargaining, a dependence theory with a central dimension
of power, was used to derive certain hypotheses about
the impact of strikes and compulsory arbitration on
teacher salaries (Delaney, 1983).

Delaney's analysis of

arbitration and strike use included all Illinois and
Iowa (K-12) school districts who negotiated collective
bargaining agreements in 1978-79, 1979-80, and 1980-81.
In order to test comprehensive availability the sample
also included data on 770 full time public school
teachers taken from the Current Population Survey's
(CPS) May 1979 data tape.
Generally, the collective bargaining literature has
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shown that in the area of arbitration usage results in
awards have been very similar to the terns of the
negotiated agreement (Anderson, 1979; Bloom, 1981),

The

author also cites previous studies by Stern et al,
(1975) and Delaney and Feuille (1982) on the impact of
compulsory arbitration in bargaining outcomes, both of
which indicate that the availability of arbitration
positively affects wages.

These findings coincide with

similar outcomes demonstrated in regard to non wage
bargaining outcomes that are noted by Kochan and Wheeler
(1975) .
Final results of Delaney's study show that the
availability of compulsory arbitration appears to
increase teacher salaries by approximately 10% while the
use of compulsory arbitration in Iowa had no effect on
teacher salaries.

It was also found that the

availability of the right to strike raises teacher
salaries by approximately 9% while the use of the strike
by Illinois public school teachers positively affects
their subsequent salaries.
These results tend to suggest that strike use
affects teacher salaries but that arbitration use does
not.

However, availability of both arbitration and the

legal or de facto right to strike has similar effects on
salary levels, increasing them by approximately 10%.
Olson (1980) in his analysis of the effects on

W
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firefighters' wages under different impasse procedures
(factfinding and compulsory arbitration) observed
positive effects in relation to salaries when compulsory
arbitration was used.

In his examination of 72 cities

with populations of 100,000 or more, initial regression
results indicated positive effects under compulsory
arbitration in respect to firefighters' wages.

This

varied over time (a six year period) with the impact of
arbitration emerging as a variable ranging from
generally insignificant for the 1972-74 period to as
high as 6% for some cases in 1975-76.

Accordingly, if a

statute were enacted in 1972, by 1977 wages would be
3.12% to 6.54% higher than they would have been were it
not for the legislation.

Olsen found these results to

be larger than estimates by Stern et al. (1975) and
Kochan et al. (1977) in which wages were examined
immediately following the passage of compulsory
arbitration laws.

He attributes this to the fact that

the full impact of compulsory arbitration legislation,
in relation to contract terms, may not be realized until
years after the law has been enacted.
In findings contrary to Delaney's and Olson's
Lowenberg (1971) in an examination of arbitration
availability and wages compared policemens' wages in New
York, Ohio and Pennsylvania over a six year period.

Of

the three states, only Pennsylvania made arbitration

F
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Farber and Katz's (1979) research develops a model
of bargaining in the presence of an arbitration
procedure which examines the implications of that model
for the usage rates of the arbitration procedure.
The authors initially point out that the major
source of leverage in arbitration is derived from the
uncertainty of the parties regarding the behavior of the
arbitrator.

The model which they developed utilized the

construct of maximization of the expected behavior by
agents in the presence of uncertainty.

This construct

is based upon the risk preferences of the parties.

The

framework for the model was introduced by von Neumann
and Morgenstern and has become a part of standard
economic analysis (Luce and Raiffa, 1957).

In essence,

if the parties are risk adverse they would be willing to
settle for less than the expected arbitration award.
Alternatively, if the parties enjoy risk they must be
paid a premium in order to be discouraged from
"enjoying" the risk of the arbitration process.
The m o d el s e e k s

to

d e te rm in e

if

th e re

is

a
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"contract zone" (area in which any settlement is
considered by both parties to be preferable to
arbitration) defined by the risk preferences of the
parties and the expectations of the parties concerning
the arbitrator's behavior.

The authors found almost a

total absence of empirical evidence in collective
bargaining literature concerning the risk preferences of
the parties in a collective bargaining situation.
However, they do believe that the union is likely to
have more of an aversion to risk than the employer.
Their reason being that since wages are probably the
primary source of income for union members, the loss of
that primary income source could result in severe
consequences to those union members.

In the context of

this particular model, it is therefore likely that the
union is more risk adverse than is the public sector
employer.
A major implication with the model is that the
presence of any arbitration procedure determines the
environment within which the parties negotiate, and
consequently, directly affects the terms of the
agreement.

The difference between arbitrated and

negotiated settlements, while not a function of the
average arbitration award, was found to be related to
the risk preferences and bargaining power of the parties
involved and also as a result of the uncertainty of the

F
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arbitrator's actions.
Farber and Katz did make some other conclusions
about their model, the first being that uncertainty
about the arbitration award will create a range of
potential negotiated settlements only if risk aversion
dominates.

Secondly, as parties become familiar with

arbitrators and the arbitration procedure the
uncertainty of the arbitration procedure will be
reduced.

Thirdly, to the degree that arbitrators rely

on the results of the factfinder in making awards the
factfinding recommendation will provide information to
the parties concerning the arbitrator's behavior, an
observation also confirmed by Gallagher (1978) and
Gallagher and Chaubey (1982).
Canada's Public Service Staff Relations Act (PSSRA)
covering all federal employees has also appeared to
serve as an incentive to bargain since its inception in
1967.

Prior to the first round of negotiations under

Canada's new act, bargaining agents for 101 units
covering 160,000 employees opted for the arbitration
procedure.

For those employees who were subject to

arbitration, 94 agreements were negotiated without
reference to arbitration.

Out of the six disputes

referred to arbitration, three were settled before the
hearing commenced, one was settled just after the
hearing began and arbitration awards were issued for the

"
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two remaining disputes (Finkleman, 1971).

Obviously,

the availability of arbitration did not destroy
collective bargaining in its first round in Canada's
public sector.

In addition, Canadian federal employees

who are dissatisfied with the results of the arbitration
process can always switch to the conciliation procedure.
This ultimately allows them to strike, an alternative
unavailable to public employees who are subject to
compulsory arbitration procedures in the United States.
The Narcotic and "Chilling" Effect of Compulsory
Arbitration

Another concern which may result when using
compulsory arbitration is the development of a narcotic
effect of its usage.

The narcotic effect occurs when

after an initial experience with arbitration, a growing
reliance on the arbitration procedure ensues, and the
parties continue to initiate the use of arbitration in
subsequent collective bargaining proceedings rather than
attempting to reach a settlement on their own.

This

narcotic effect is often said to generate a chilling
effect on the negotiations process, causing parties to
allow a neutral third party to make their bargaining
decisions for them.
Stern (1974) in viewing Wisconsin's record found
that such a narcotic effect did not result in Wisconsin
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where the parties tended to settle disputes by
themselves rather than abdicate the responsibility to
others.

In about 2/3 of the 173 negotiations for the

year 1973, the parties reached agreement without any
third party assistance.

Mediation took place in the

remaining 1/3 of contract negotiations with 3/4 of those
mediated disputes being resolved.

In only 9% of the 173

negotiations were arbitral awards issued.

Results

similar to those found in 1973 were also recorded for
Wisconsin's negotiation agreements in 1974.
The Wisconsin record tends to refute the statement
made by Willard Wertz at the 1963 meeting of the
National Academy of Arbitrators in Chicago during which
he stated that:
E x p e r i e n c e ----- p a r t i c u l a r l y

t h e W ar L a b o r B o a r d

experience during the 4 0 1s --

shows that a

statutory requirement that labor disputes be
submitted to arbitration has a narcotic effect on
private bargainers, that they turn to it as an easy
and habit forming --

release from the

obligation of hard, responsible bargaining.
Lipsky and Drotning (1977) in their findings from
research on the narcotic effect of compulsory
arbitration i

'ew York came to a different conclusion.

They examined the use of various impasse procedures
utilized by teacher associations and school districts in

W
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New York during the first five years (1968-72) of New
York's Taylor Law.

The authors examined whether a

narcotic effect was evident during the time in question
and to what extent salary settlements differed from
settlements that would have been expected in the absence
of the impasse procedures mandated under the Taylor Law.
The study sample included only districts that
actually engaged in negotiations in any of the years
1968-72.

The number of districts negotiating varied in

number from a low of 597 in 19 71 to a high of 706 in
1968.

In absolute terms the number of districts at

impasse increased from 172 in 1968 to 358 in 1972.

The

authors' data shows that by 1972 only 44% of the teacher
units in New York State were able to reach agreement on
contract terms without third party intervention.
In examining the level of impasse at which
settlements were made it is noted that over time
factfinders settled more and more teacher cases by means
of mediation, rather than by issuing a formal
factfinding report.
In examining if a narcotic effect resulted, the
authors show that during the 1968-72 period 154 (22.3%)
of the districts never had an impasse, 51 (7.3%) went to
impasse every year and 42% went to impasse half of the
time.

These statistics demonstrate that a significant

proportion of New York teacher bargaining units went to

W
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impasse during the 1968-72 period.
The authors also applied multivariate analysis to
the data and through the use of regression and
discriminant analysis tried to answer the question; What
were the most important factors leading to the
declaration of an impasse?

They found unambiguous

evidence that the most important determinant of an
impasse in a district in one year was the existence of
an impasse in the district in the preceding year.

About

30% of the variance in any one year's impasse experience
could be explained by the previous year's impasse
experience.

No other economic or environmental factor

tested came close to this level of explanatory power.
In fact, most independent variables tested were
insignificant.

The authors felt that this provided the

clearest evidence of a narcotic effect with New York
teacher bargaining units.
Lipsky and Drotning also examined the impact of the
impasse procedure on salary levels.

Their model shows

the regression coefficient for the various impasse steps
when three different salary points from teacher salary
schedules were used as dependent variables.
following trends were apparent:

The

(1) the use of impasse

procedures generally had an insignificant effect on the
base level of salaries;

(2) use of the impasse

procedures had a small or insignificant effect on the
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base level of the two higher salary points in the first
year (1968) of the Taylor Law;

(3) in 1969, 1970 and

somewhat in 1971, teachers gained significantly higher
salaries at the two higher salary points when using an
impasse procedure; and, (4) teachers who used the strike
gained less than their colleagues who settled their
contract differences in mediation, factfinding or higher
impasse steps.
A study by Wheeler (1978) which introduced a set of
measures of compromise activity in bargaining, was
conducted to measure the occurrence of any chilling in
the collective bargaining process for firefighters.

The

analysis was to determine whether compulsory arbitration
has a chilling effect on bargaining by comparing the
amount of compromise activity or movement which takes
place in the presence v. absence of a compulsory
arbitration law.
The sample for his original study in 1972 included
370 cities which bargain collectively with the
International Association of Fire Fighters (IAFF).
Questionnaires were sent to individuals identified as
negotiators for IAFF locals or city management.

Only

responses which involved the use of an impasse
resolution procedure were used with the sample including
140 (37%) of the original 370 cities.

Since wages were

the basic issue in nearly all negotiations the author

W'
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felt that if a chilling effect was to be found it was
likely to appear in respect to wages.

Therefore, data

was collected in relation to wage demands and offers in
the negotiation process.

To analyze the data a series

of measures of compromise activity (movement by the
parties) was constructed.

Less movement by the parties

in the presence of a compulsory arbitration law is
viewed of as being supportive of the argument that
compulsory arbitration chills bargaining.

The measures

of movement in bargaining from opening position to
impasse position, using the issue of wages, were
constructed as follows:
Management Movement to Impasse Offer:
Management Impasse Offer - Management Opening Offer
Existing Wage

X 100

Union Movement to Impasse Demand:
Union Opening Demand ~ Union Impasse Demand
Existing Wage

X 100

The measure of the gap between the union impasse
demand and the management impasse offer were constructed
as follows with a high score on either of the last two
measures indicating a low amount of compromise activity:
Gap:
Union Impasse Demand - Management Impasse Offer
Gap as Percentage of Existing Wage:

F
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Union Impasse Demand - Managaement Impasse Offer
Existing Wage

X 100

The author proceeded to compare behavior under both
factfinding and compulsory arbitration since factfinding
is not a binding procedure while arbitration is, using a
t test to measure movement.

Therefore, if the chilling

effect does exist it would be greater under compulsory
arbitration than under factfinding which does not bind
the parties.
The findings exhibit significantly less movement by
management from opening offer to impasse under
compulsory arbitration than under factfinding with union
movement being insignificant under these two conditions
of impasse.

When the gap between union and management

positions was measured both in dollar terms and as a
percentage of the existing wage, it appeared that less
movement occurred in the presence of compulsory
arbitration than in the presence of factfinding.

The

data provides some evidence that compulsory arbitration
does have a chilling effect on public sector collective
bargaining with firefighters.

This was most evident

when viewing management bargainers who had a reluctance
to change position on the starting wage in cases where a
compulsory arbitration law existed.

Some kind of

chilling is also suggested by the data which shows that
the gap remaining between parties' impasse positions was
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greater under compulsory arbitration than under
factfinding.
Gallagher and Pegnetter (1979) also make reference
to criticisms of statutes such as Iowa's in which
mandatory arbitration procedures are believed to "chill"
the bargaining process.

Under the Iowa plan the authors

found that 25% of the bargaining relationships that used
factfinding in round one and then negotiated went onto
use factfinding again in the second round of bargaining.
It was noted that none of the bargaining relationships
that used arbitration in the first round repeated
arbitration in the second round while seven of the nine
bargaining units that used all three steps in round one
settled in round two without an impasse or at the
mediation stage.

These findings also refute the premise

that compulsory arbitration "chills" bargaining and
creates a narcotic effect on the usage of arbitration to
settle future impasses.
Mann (1981) also notes that in Connecticut during
the first year of the new law providing for compulsory
arbitration, 50% of the impasses went to arbitration but
that by 1981-82 fewer than 30% took a similar route,
showing a significant decline as opposed to an increase
or narcotic effect in arbitration usage.

Compulsory Arbitration as a Deterrent to the Strike

¥
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In recent years public labor union officials have
feared public repercussions against strikes.

As the

toll of strikes has mounted, the public's willingness to
resist unions and future strikes has been strengthened.
The support President Reagan received for his stand
against the air traffic controllers demonstrated
evidence for such a backlash against unions. For that
reason, unions have for the most part endorsed
compulsory arbitration as a means of avoiding work
stoppages while achieving bargaining goals (Johnson,
1983).

These union officials have argued that

compulsory arbitration is a viable quid-pro-quo for
foregoing the strike option, an observation made by
others (Anderson, 1969; McKelvey, 1969; Lowenberg, 1971;
Greer, 1978).
Lowenberg (1971) reports that preliminary
assessment on the use of compulsory arbitration as a
substitute for the strike has been favorable as far as
the absence of strikes is concerned.

In Pennsylvania,

Lowenberg found that under Act 111 of 1968 for
firefighters and police there were at least 66
arbitration awards during its first year in use.

He

also found that the availability of compulsory
arbitration did not terminate collective bargaining
among police and firefighters as 2/3 (133 of 198) of the

IF
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municipalities discussed in his article arrived at a
negotiated settlement.

In addition, there were no

strikes by police and firefighters during that time.
West (1980) found that in Wisconsin settlements
have been reached more quickly and with better results
since the ^state adopted Senate Bill 15 (SB 15) giving
teachers the use of compulsory arbitration to settle the
terms of a contract.

He notes that in Wisconsin there

were no illegal strikes in units of 500 teachers or less
since the passage of SB 15.

Murphy, Fleming and

Broeniman (1980) concur stating that Senate Bill 15,
which provides for compulsory arbitration has balanced
the relative power of [school] boards and [teacher]
associations by virtually eliminating teacher strikes in
Wisconsin.
In other parts of the country compulsory
arbitration statutes which effect public education have
also been viewed of as a deterrent to the strike.

Mann

(1981) in reference to Connecticut, feels that the laws
mandating mediation and compulsory arbitration in the
revised statute of 1979 may go a long way toward
improving the working relationship between teacher
bargaining units and Boards of Education in the state.
This revision in the law is said to have had its roots
in the Bridgeport, Connecticut teachers' strike of 1978
during which a judge levied a $194,000 fine on the

w
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strikers and sent 274 teachers to jail —

the largest

number of public employees in American history to go to
jail.

The National Education Association's (NEA)

general counsel, Robert Chanin, in reference to the
Bridgeport strike relayed that "if the courts become
hostile toward teacher strikes, binding interest
arbitration [compulsory arbitration] is likely to emerge
as an alternative to collective bargaining."

Summary

America's experience with compulsory arbitration in
the public sector has been limited when comparing it to
that of the private sector or nations such as Australia
and Canada.

Although compulsory arbitration is in its

infancy stage in the United States it has already made
dramatic inroads in the vital services and more recently
in the realm of public education.
Proponents of compulsory arbitration view the
process as a viable means of settling interest disputes
while continuing to maintain public welfare as a top
priority.

It has worked well as a deterrent to the

strike, especially in states where police and
firefighters are prevented from withholding services
which provide for the health and safety of the public.
Conversely, it has been looked at as being

¥
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detrimental to the collective bargaining process by
those individuals who do not view compulsory arbitration
as an acceptable means for settling interest disputes.
Adversaries of compulsory arbitration feel that it
breaks down the bargaining process and is a "scapegoat"
for parties who are unwilling to sit down and bargain.
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A review of the literature demonstrates that
presently there is a need for further research in the
area of compulsory arbitration for public school
teachers.

Only within the last 10 years has it emerged

as an area of impasse dispute resolution available to
the country's teaching workforce.

Studies such as this

one will provide the information needed to adequately
analyze the advantages and disadvantages of using
compulsory arbitration as a means of settling impasse
disputes in the years to come.
Finally, as more and more states examine the
possibilities of including compulsory arbitration in the

I
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revision or development of collective bargaining
legislation, it will be necessary to acknowledge the
greater role that it will be playing in the future of
collective bargaining for America's public school
teachers.
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Chapter 3
The History of Collective Bargaining Legislation
in Connecticut

Initial development for the future of collective
bargaining legislation for public school teachers in the
state of Connecticut was realized in 1951 when the
Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors in Norwalk Teachers'
Association v. Board of Education [138 Conn. 269, 83
A2d 482 (1951)] held that teachers had the right to
organize and bargain over pay and working conditions
with their board of education (Id. at 277, 83 a.2d at
486) .
Connecticut's collective bargaining legislation for
public school teachers has come a long way since that
initial decision in Norwalk.

Today, Connecticut has

one of the most comprehensive collective bargaining laws
in education, and may be a forerunner of what is to come
in other states that are in the process of adopting or
changing collective bargaining legislation for public
school teachers.
Following the Norwalk decision, Connecticut's
Commissioner of Education appointed a committee to

45
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examine the working relationship between teacher
organizations and boards of education in the state.
Their final report, Bulletin 85 (Connecticut State Board
of Education, Principles and Procedures in Working
Relations of Boards of Education and Teacher
Organizations) was adopted in 1957.

Bulletin 85, with

some revisions, provided the background for
teacher/board bargaining in Connecticut until 1965.
During that time period Connecticut's General Assembly
also adopted its first statute which dealt with the
collective bargaining process for public school
teachers.

Public Act 61 - 562 stated that:

"Members of

the teaching profession shall have the right to join or
refuse to join any organization for professional or
economic improvement without prejudice."
Pub. Acts 562).

(1961 Conn.

This statute was the first in a line of

legislation which would deal with boards of education
and teacher negotiations in the state of Connecticut.
Over the years, a number of additional acts were
adopted which further developed the collective
bargaining structure for Connecticut's public school
teachers.

Public Act 65 - 298 provided for the

designation of representatives to represent employees in
negotiations, "with respect to salaries and other
conditions of employment."
ss 3).

(1965 Conn. Pub. Acts 298,

In 1967, Public Act 67 - 752 dealt with the
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selection of exclusive bargaining representatives (1967
Conn. Pub. Acts 752, ss 1), while Public Act 69 - 811
gave the Commissioner of Education the power to certify
or refuse to certify an exclusive bargaining
representative [1969 Conn. Pub. Acts 811, ss 2 (d)].
This Act also provided for an arbitration panel of not
less than ten or greater than twenty-five members to
hear disputes.
Additional legislation occurred in 1975 when the
General Assembly instructed the State Board of Education
to prepare a set of guidelines to cover good faith
bargaining, fair labor practices and conditions of
employment [1975 Conn. Acts 9 (Spec. Sess.)].
In 1976, Public Act 76 - 403 provided for various
other amendments.

One specifically mandated a strict

timetable for the commencing and progression of
negotiations, stating that negotiations were to begin
"no fewer than one hundred eighty days prior to the
board of education's budget submission date."

A second

provided standards of practices that were prohibited for
both boards of education and employee organizations (Id.
ss 5).
The year 1979 brought two major legislative
dictates that would further affect teacher bargaining in
the state.

One, Public Act 79 - 422, permitted the

negotiation of the inclusion of an agency fee provision

F
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into collective bargaining agreements [1979 Conn. Acts
422 (Reg. Sess.)].

.The second, Public Act 79 - 405,

which this study deals with in detail, provided that, if
parties were unable to resolve contract disputes,
arbitration of those disputes, on an issue by issue
basis would become final and binding instead of advisory
[1979 Conn. Acts 405 (Reg. Sess.)].

(See Appendix A for

complete proof).
Initially, the Act (Public Act 79 - 405)
established an arbitration panel with fifteen members,
five to represent the interests of the boards of
education, five to represent the interests of the
exclusive bargaining representatives of certified
employees and five to represent the interests of the
public in general.

Boards of education and unions would

nominate individuals to serve as advocate arbitrators
for their respective parties and the State Board of
Education would nominate arbitrators to represent the
public interests.

The governor would then appoint

fifteen arbitrators whose term would be concurrent with
the governor's.
(Reg. Sess.)].

[1979 Conn. Acts 405, ss 1 (a) (3)
Under this initial Act, parties could

choose a single impartial arbitrator or a tripartite
(three member) panel.

[Id. ss 1 (c) (1)].

The arbitrator or tripartite panel was then to
decide the issues in dispute on an issue by issue basis,

F
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talcing into consideration the last best offer of each of
the bargaining parties [1979 Conn. Acts 405, ss 1 (c)
(4) (Reg. Sess.)], while using the following six
criteria to formulate decisions:

(1) The negotiations

between the parties prior to arbitration;

(2) the public

interest and the financial capability of the school
district;
group;

(3) the interests and welfare of the employee

(4) changes in the cost of living; (5) the

existing conditions of employment of the employee group
and those of similar groups; and, (6) the salaries,
fringe benefits, and other conditions of employment
prevailing in the state labor market [1979 Conn. Acts
405, ss 1 (c) (4) (Reg. Sess.)] in issuing their award.
Any stipulations previously agreed to were to be
incorporated into the arbitration award, and the final
binding award could not be rejected by the community's
legislative body (board of finance).
Since that initial legislation in 1979, there have
been some additional amendments to Public Act 79 - 405.
In 1983, there was an increase in the size of the
arbitration panel from fifteen to twenty-one, giving
each group seven members rather than five. [1983 Conn.
Acts 72 ss 2 (c), (d) (Reg. Sess.)]

This session also

provided for a change in the mediation and arbitration
timetables [Id. ss 5 (b), (c)].

Under the 1983

amendment, mediation would commence one hundred ten days

¥
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prior to budget submission and arbitration would
commence eighty-five days prior to budget submission.
This shortened the previous time periods by ten and five
days respectively.

Three other timeline changes

occurred at this time.

First, the time of the initial

arbitration hearing is to take place between the seventh
and fifteenth day following selection of the neutral
arbitrator [Id. ss (c)J.

The two other changes extended

the length of the arbitration hearing period from twenty
to twenty-five days, and the timeline for the issuance
of a written award went from fifteen to twenty days.
[Id. ss 5 (b), (c)].
Later, Public Act 83 - 342 provided for awarding
reasonable attorney's fees, costs and legal interest on
money withheld as a result of the arbitral decision
[1983 Conn. Acts 342, subdiv. (7) ss (c)].
In 1984, Public Act 84 - 459 was amended to require
that the written arbitral decision contain a narrative
explaining the evaluation by the arbitrators of the
evidence presented for each item upon which a decision
was rendered.

This narrative was to use the six

criteria provided under Public Act 79 - 405 ss 1 (c) (4)
(Reg. Sess.).
In 1985, there was once again a change in the
number of members sitting on the arbitration panel.
Public Act 85 - 343 increased the number of arbitrators
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from twenty-one to twenty-three, with the additional
members representing the public interests.

Another

change in the numbers was prompted in 1986 during a
special session of the legislature, during which Public
Act 86 - 1 increased the number of arbitrators
representing the public interests from nine to fifteen
C1986 Conn. Acts 1, ss (a) (Spec. Sess.)].

The

amendment also substituted a panel of arbitrators
submitted by the American Arbitration Association for a
list of arbitrators submitted by the State Board of
Education.

Finally, it provided that the commissioner

designate rather than the party arbitrators select the
third impartial arbitrator.
The most recent amendments from the original Act of
1979 are found in Public Act 87 - 206 which again deals
with a change in the number of panel members.

Under the

most recent amendment, there shall be not less than
twenty-four nor more than twenty-nine persons serving on
the arbitration board [1987 Conn. Acts 206, ss (1) (a)].
Seven will represent the interests of local and regional
school boards, seven will represent the interests of the
exclusive bargaining representatives of certified
employees and not less than ten nor more than fifteen
members shall be the impartial representatives of the
interests of the public in general [Id. Sec. 1 (c)].
This amendment also provides that the list of names of

r
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arbitrators for the public interest will now come from
the list of names submitted by the State Board of
Education [Id. Sec. 1 (3)].

Additionally, the third

arbitrator on an arbitration panel is to be selected by
the arbitrators for the other two parties, with failure
to do so within five days resulting in the
commissioner's choosing the third arbitrator [Id. Sect.
2 Sub. div. 1 ss (c)3.
Today the legislation for mediation - arbitration
in Connecticut is quite definitive.

The numbers on the

arbitration panel have changed during the years, but
presently stand at twenty-four to twenty-nine, with
seven arbitrators representing the interests of boards
of education, seven representing the exclusive
bargaining representatives of certified employees, and
no less than ten nor more than fifteen representing the
interests of the public in general [1987 Conn. Acts 206,
ss (1) (a)3*

Impartial representatives of the interests

of the public in general shall be:

Residents of the

state of Connecticut, experienced in the public sector
collective bargaining interest impasse resolution and
selected for the panel of labor arbitrators submitted by
the State Board of Education [Id. ss (1) (a)].

If any

vacancy occurs on the panel, the governor shall act
within forty days to fill such vacancy (Sect. 4 - 19).
Additionally, persons serving on the panel shall serve

r

r
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without compensation but shall receive a per diem fee
[Id. ss (1) (c)3.
When impasse in negotiations results, either party
may submit issues in dispute to the commissioner for
mediation if no agreement is reached one hundred ten
days prior to the budget submission date [Id. ss (1)
(b)].

Mediators are to be chosen from a panel of

mediators selected by the State Board of Education or
from outside such panel if mutually agreed by the
parties [Id. ss (1) (b)].

Mediators receive a per diem

rate and the parties share equally in the cost of
mediation.

The mediator shall not disclose confidential

information in the course of mediation unless the party
making such communication waives such privilege.

The

commissioner may recommend a basis for settlement but it
is not binding on the parties and such recommendation
shall be made twenty-five days after the day on which
mediation begins [Id. ss (1) (b)].
On the fourth day next following the end of the
mediation session or on the eighty-fifth day prior to
the budget submission date, whichever is sooner, the
commissioner shall order the parties to report their
settlement or the name of the single arbitrator mutually
selected by them or the name of the arbitrator selected
by each of them.

Arbitrators selected by the parties

will then select a third arbitrator to represent the

F
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public interests [1987 Conn. Acts 206, (1) (c)].

If the

parties do not select a third arbitrator within five
days after party arbitrators have been selected, the
commissioner shall select the third arbitrator [Id. ss
(1) (c)].

Whenever a panel of three arbitrators is

selected, the chairperson of such panel shall be the
representative of the public interests [Id. ss (c) (1)].
The chairperson or single arbitrator sets the date,
time and place for the hearing to be held in the school
district between the seventh and the fifteenth day,
inclusive, giving written notice of that information to
the parties in dispute at least five days prior to the
hearing.

At the hearing each party shall have full

opportunity to submit all relevant evidence, introduce
relevant documents and written material, and to argue on
behalf of its positions [Id. ss (2)].
The hearing may be continued but in the event shall
be concluded within twenty-five days after its
commencement [Id. ss (3)] and a written decision shall
be rendered within twenty days, signed by a majority of
the arbitrators, including a narrative (written by the
chairperson) explaining the evaluation by the
arbitrators.

One copy shall be filed with the

commissioner, each town clerk in the school district
involved, and the board of education and organization
which are parties in dispute [Id. ss (4)].
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The decision is final and binding and the written
decision shall incorporate those items of agreement the
parties have reached prior to its issuance.

The

arbitrator/arbitrators shall resolve separately each
individual issue disputed by accepting the last best
offer of either of the parties and the decision of the
arbitrators or the single arbitrator shall not be
subject to rejection by the legislative body of the
local or regional school district or by referendum.

The

parties shall pay the fee of the arbitrator selected by
or for them and share equally the fee of the third
arbitrator or the single arbitrator and all other costs
incidental to the arbitration [Id. ss (4)].
Decisions of the panel or single arbitrator are
subject to judicial review upon the filing by a party to
the arbitration within thirty days following receipt of
a final decision to vacate or modify such decision in
the superior court.

The superior court after hearing

may vacate or modify the decision if substantial rights
of a party have been prejudiced because such a decision
is:

(A) In violation of constitutional or statutory

provisions;
the panel;

(B) in excess of the statutory authority of
(C) made upon unlawful procedure; (D)

affected by other error of law; (E) clearly erroneous in
view of the reliable, probative and substantial evidence
on the whole record; or, (F) arbitrary or capricious or

F
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characterized
unwarranted

b y

abuse

exercise

of

or

discretion

discretion

or

Lid.

clearly
ss

(7)].

Finally, under the current legislation the
commissioner and the arbitrator/arbitrators shall have
the same power and duties as the board under section 31
- 108 for the purposes of mediation or arbitration
pursuant to section (7) (d), and subsection (c) of
section 10 - 153d and provisions in section 31 - 108
with respect to procedure, jurisdiction of the superior
court, witnesses and penalities shall apply.
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CHAPTER 4
Research and Methodology

The following segment of the research will define
the types of data that were collected and the procedures
used to analyze the data.

The first section of the

analysis covered statistical questions pertaining to the
first six years, 1979-80 through 1984-85, under
Connecticut's compulsory arbitration statute for public
school teachers [1979 Conn. Acts 405 (Reg. Sess.)].

The

second section included questions that constituted the
primary basis for interviews that were conducted with
various individuals who were involved with the
compulsory arbitration procedure in Connecticut.
The following research questions A through H,
examined numerical data on the compulsory arbitration
process from the state of Connecticut for the years
1979-80 through 1984-85.

Numerical data was obtained

from the Connecticut Department of Education by the
researcher during trips to the Department in Hartford,
Connecticut.

(See Appendix B for complete proof).

In

reviewing each of the questions, information is provided
on how and from what sources data was collected.

57
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Information also includes the types of analyses that
were performed on the data.

Research Hypothesis;

That legislated compulsory (final-

offer interest) arbitration fosters collective
bargaining in public education.

Question A :

Has there been a change in the number of

times that parties have used compulsory arbitration to
settle impasse disputes since the passage of legislation
providing for compulsory arbitration?
Data on the number of times compulsory arbitration
was utilized for the years 1979-80 through 1984-85 was
obtained from the Connecticut Department of Education.
The data was analyzed using a Chi square test for the
six years being examined.

The nonparametric Chi square

test was chosen as the means of analysis for Question A
because the procedure deals with frequency counts, in
this instance the number of times compulsory arbitration
was used for the years 1979-80 through 1984-85.
The null hypothesis for Question A states that,
"There will be no significant difference in the number
of times that compulsory arbitration was used during the
1979-80 through 1984-85 period."
was placed at the .05 level.

Level of significance

If the level of

significance exceeded .05 the null hypothesis was

F
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rejected.
Results were also examined to determine if
"chilling” of the bargaining process was evidenced by
the parties' unwillingness to attempt bargaining and
immediately initiate a request for compulsory
arbitration.

Question B :

Has there been a change in the number of

collective bargaining agreements settled without the use
of any impasse procedure since passage of legislation
providing for compulsory arbitration?
Data on the number of collective bargaining
agreements negotiated and the level of the process at
which they were settled was obtained from the
Connecticut Department of Education for the years 197980 through 1984-85.
A Chi square was conducted on this data for each of
the six years analyzed.

This data also interrelated

with Question A in attempting to determine if reliance
on the compulsory arbitration procedure grew, remained
constant or lessened over time.
The null hypothesis for Question B states that,
"There will be no significant difference in the number
of times that contracts were settled without the use of
an impasse procedure during the 1979-80 through 1984-85
period."

Level of significance was placed at the .05

.......
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level.

A significance exceeding the .05 level resulted

in a rejection of the null hypothesis.

Question C :

Has there been a change in the average

number of issues taken to arbitration from one year to
the next since the passage of legislation providing for
compulsory arbitration?
Data on the number of issues taken to impasse in
each compulsory arbitration procedure was obtained for
the years 1979-80 through 1984-85 from the Connecticut
Department of Education.
A t test was performed on the data concerning the
average number of issues taken to arbitration to
determine the frequency of reliance on the process.

The

null hypothesis for Question C states that, "There will
be no significant difference in the average number of
issues taken to impasse for the years 1979-80 through
1984-85."

The level of significance was set at .05.

A

significance greater than .05 resulted in rejection of
the null hypothesis.

Question D :

Have more negotiation impasses been settled

at the preliminary step in the impasse procedure
(mediation), rather than continuing to compulsory
arbitration since passage of legislation providing for
compulsory arbitration?

w
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Statistical data on the number of times mediation
resulted in the settlement of impasse disputes was
obtained from the Connecticut Department of Education
for the years 1979-80 through 1984-85.
A Chi square test was performed on the data to
determine if any significant differences could be
determined when examining the use of mediation or
arbitration as the final step in the impasse procedure.
The null hypothesis for Question D stated that,
"There is no significant difference in the number of
impasses being settled at the preliminary step of
mediation in the impasse procedure."

The level of

significance was set at .05 and the null hypothesis was
rejected if the level of significance exceeded .05.

Question E ;

Can a pattern be determined in the usage

rates of compulsory arbitration over the first six year
following the statute's enactment?
Data for the usage rates of compulsory arbitration
for Connecticut's public school teachers was obtained
from the Connecticut Department of Education for the
years 1979-80 through 1984-85.

In comparing the

statistics for each proceeding year, the data was
examined to determine if a trend appeared to be
developing over the years of compulsory arbitration's
usage in Connecticut's public education sector.

In

Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

determining whether any trends had developed with
compulsory arbitration's usage, the data attempted to
ascertain if a narcotic effect was evidenced by the use
of compulsory arbitration over the six year period.

Question F :

Is one type of issue taken to compulsory

arbitration more often than any other?
Data for the type of issue taken to compulsory
arbitration was obtained from arbitration awards that
were on file at the Connecticut Department of Education
for the 1979-80 through 1984-85 period.

Categories of

issues for arbitration were:
1.

Salary

2.

Salary scale

3.

Medical insurance

4.

Dental insurance

5.

Life insurance

6.

Ex tracurricular

7.

Athletic

8.

Severance pay

9.

Department head/coordinator

10.

Summer school/homebound

11.

Early retirement

12.

Longevity

13.

Assignments/transfers

14.

Evaluations
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15.

Workday/year

16.

Class size

17.

Leaves

i—■
CD
•
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Reduc tion/recall

19.

Curriculum

20.

Duration

21.

Dues deduction

22.

Grievance

23.

Miscellaneous
Initially an analysis of variance was

determine if any statistically significant differences
occurred.

When a difference occurred, the post hoc

Least Significant Difference (LSD) test was performed to
determine between what areas the differences occurred.
The null hypothesis for Question F was that, "There is
no significant difference in the area of issue being
arbitrated for the years 1979-80 through 1984-85."
Level of significance was placed at the .05 level.
Significance exceeding the .05 level resulted in
rejection of the null hypothesis.

Question G ;

Did arbitrators rule for the board or the

association's position more often in compulsory
arbitration decisions over the six year period following
enactment of legislation providing for compulsory
arbitration?

F
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Data for the years 1979-80 through 1984-85 was
obtained from the Connecticut Department of Education.
A t test was performed on the data for each of the six
years analyzed and also for the six year period in
total.
The null hypothesis for Question G states that,
"There is no significant difference in the number of
times an arbitrator(s) decided in favor of a particular
party in compulsory arbitration decisions during the
1979-80 through 1984-85 period."

Level of significance

was placed at the .05 level with a significance above
the .05 level resulting in rejection of the null
hypothesis.

Question H :

Is the category of the issue of impasse

independent of the arbitrator's deciding in favor of
management or the union?
Data for the arbitral decision and category of
issue for arbitration was obtained from the Connecticut
Department of Education for the years 1979-80 through
1984-85.

An anlaysis of variance was performed on the

data to determine if the area of issue for arbitration
correlated with the party in whose favor the arbitrator
decided.

An analysis of variance was used to determine

if the category of issue differed significantly in
arbitral decisions and whether the categories interacted

F
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significantly with one another.

When a difference was

found, the Least Significant Difference (LSD) post hoc
test was performed to determine where the differences
occurred.
The null hypothesis for Question H stated that,
"The category of the issue of impasse is not significant
in relation to the party in whose favor the arbitrator
decides."
level.

The level of significance was set at the .05

A significance greater than .05 resulted in

rejection of the null hypothesis.

A second set of research questions concentrated on
how the arbitration procedure was perceived by those
individuals involved with the process for public school
teachers in Connecticut.
Questions were answered through responses to
interviews which were conducted as the second part of
this research.
Question I :

Has the Connecticut Education Association

shown satisfaction with the use of compulsory
arbitration for the resolution of interest disputes for
public school teachers in Connecticut by continuing to
support legislation for compulsory arbitration?
Question J ;

Has the Connecticut Department of Education

shown satisfaction with the use of compulsory
arbitration for the resolution of interest disputes for

IF
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public school teachers in Connecticut by continuing to
support legislation for compulsory arbitration?
Question K :

Has the Connecticut School Board

Association shown satisfaction with the use of
compulsory arbitration for the resolution of interest
disputes for public school teachers in Connecticut by
continuing to support legislation for compulsory
arbitration?
Question L :

Has the American Federation of Teachers

shown satisfaction with the use of compulsory
arbitration for the resolution of interest disputes for
public school teachers in Connecticut by continuing to
support legislation for compulsory arbitration?
Question M :

Have members of the arbitration panel shown

satisfaction with the use of compulsory arbitration for
the resolution of interest disputes for public school
teachers in Connecticut by continuing to support
legislation for compulsory arbitration?
Question N :

Have any of the groups in Questions I

through M shown any dissatisfaction with the legislation
for compulsory arbitration for public school teachers in
Connecticut?
1.

What are the factors causing the

dissatisfaction?
2.

What recommendations or amendments would they

suppor t?

'
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A set of eight interview questions were utilized to
answer Questions I through N .

The questions were aimed

at determining an individual1s perception of the
compulsory arbitration procedure including satisfaction
or dissatisfaction with the procedure in Connecticut,
the reasons for this satisfaction or dissatisfaction and
recommendations or amendments that the individual made
concerning the compulsory arbitration legislation.
The questions were presented to the individuals
through telephone interviews.

The questions were

incorporated into an interview guide.

The guide had

each question printed in it, along with sufficient space
for the interviewer to write down the responses of each
subject.
The format for the interview was semi structured.
First, questions that were structured were presented to
the subject.

These questions were followed by open-

ended questions which allowed the subject to elaborate
on his or her responses.
Although individuals being interviewed were
familiar with the compulsory arbitration process,
questions did not include jargon or technical terms that
might be unfamiliar or cloud the subject's responses in
any way.

Questions did not include negative wording to

avoid misinterpretation of the questions and leading or
biased questions were avoided so that subjects were not

F
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given hints as to how the researcher might prefer they
answer.
Copies of the aforementioned questions were sent to
the subjects prior to the interview so that they had
sufficient time to review the questions.

This was also

done so that any additional responses to the interview
questions could be forwarded to the researcher by the
subjects.
Prior to the actual interviewing, the researcher
conducted a piloting of the interview questions with
individuals from Pennsylvania who were familiar with
labor law and the arbitration procedure in that state.
Although it would have been more desirable to do a pilot
with individuals involved with the procedure in
Connecticut, the number of individuals on the
arbitration panel was relatively small and the
researcher wanted to be able to include all responses
from individuals on that panel as part of the research.
The following questions were answered in relation
to Connecticut's legislation which provides compulsory
interest arbitration for the resolution of interest
disputes for public school teachers.

1.

How many years have you been involved in the

compulsory arbitration process in Connecticut?
a.

F

In what capacity?

r
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b.

Approximately how many compulsory arbitration

procedures have you been directly involved in?

2.

What occurrences do you believe were responsible for

the move to enact legislation for compulsory
arbitration?

3.

What is your opinion of the present compulsory

arbitration legislation?

(a) strengths, (b) weaknesses,

(c) effectiveness, (d) suggestions for change?

4.

What is your opinion of the availability of

compulsory arbitration for settling impasse disputes?

5.

How have the bargaining parties responded to

compulsory arbitration as a means of settling impasse
disputes?

6.

Given your experience, how would you evaluate the

use of compulsory arbitration vs. mediation for settling
impasse disputes?

7.

What unanticipated affects of the legislation have

manifest themselves since initiation of the compulsory
arbitration procedure?
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8.

What is your overall assessment of the practice of

compulsory arbitration as you have experienced it?
Should it be (a) continued, (b) modified, (c)
eliminated?

Assumptions and Limitations

The following were assumptions that the researcher
made when collecting
1.

data forthe study.

They were:

That individuals gave honest responses to the

questions posed in the interviews.
2.

The statistical data obtained from state agencies

was accurate.
The study also had the following limitations:
1.

Data will include information from only the state of

Connecticut.
2.

The study covers a period of six years.

3.

Some individuals who were

involved in thecompulsory

arbitration process were not available for an interview.
4.

The group of individuals interviewed was relatively

small.
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Chapter 5
Data Analysis

The following section will show a breakdown of the
issues arbitrated in districts utilizing compulsory
arbitration for the years 1979-1980, 1980-1981, 19811982, 1982-1983, 1983-1984 and 1984-1985.

This is done

according to the category of issue arbitrated and how
many issues were decided in favor of the board and the
association.

(See Appendix B for complete proof).

This

information, combined with data on the number of
bargaining agreements and the way in which those
agreements were made (without any impasse, in mediation
or in arbitration) over the six year period, will be
used to analyze Questions A through H of the research
project.
Questions A, B and D deal with the various
procedures available for coming to contract agreement in
Connecticut.

The three are: (1) Settlement without the

use of an impasse procedure,

(2) settlement through

mediation and (3) settlement through compulsory
arbitration.

Data concerning the number of public

school teacher contracts negotiated, the number settled

71
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without impasse, those settled in mediation and those
settled in arbitration were obtained from the
Connecticut Department of Education and are shown in
Table 1 for each of the six years being studied.

Table 1
PROCEDURES USED TO SETTLE CONTRACTS
FOR THE YEARS 1979-80 THROUGH 1984-85
79-80 80-81 81-82 82-83 83-84 84-85
# to be negotiated

84

86

93

95

101

100

No impasse

25

29

31

19

32

22

Mediation

20

33

31

39

46

50

Arbitration

39

24

31

37

23

28

A series of Chi square tests were performed on the
data in Table 1 to answer Questions A, B and D . The
formula for the Chi square test used to answer Questions
A, B and D when combining all six years is:
CP ;

~ e-,)*
e.i

The Chi square formula used when comparing one year
to the year following it is:
,
-7

n (ad - be)
=

-------------------

(a+c) (a+b) (b+d) (c+d)
Question A asks if there has been a change in the
number of times that parties have gone to compulsory
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arbitration to settle impasse disputes since passage of
legislation providing for compulsory arbitration?
When comparing the six years combined, Chi square
at the‘=<.05 with 5 degrees of freedom would have to
produce a value that was greater than 11.070 in order to
denote that a statistically significant difference
occurred.

The test value for the six year total was

15.466 which indicated that a significant difference
occurred.

The second set of Chi square tests were

performed comparing the data on a year to year basis.
The results of those tests are shown in Table 2.

Table 2
RESULTS OF CHI SQUARE 2X2 CONTINGENCY TABLE ON THE NUMBER
OF TIMES COMPULSORY ARBITRATION HAS BEEN USED TO
COME TO A CONTRACT AGREEMENT
Year 1

to2 (79-80 to 80-81)

6.250*

Year 2

to3 (80-81 to 81-82)

0.180

Year 3

to4 (81-82 to 82-83)

0.642

Year 4

to5 (82-83 to 83-84)

6.030*

Year 5

to6 (83-84 to 84-85)

0.725

(note:

3.841,

df = 1,

.05)

*significant at .05
In testing for statistical significance from year
to year a significant difference was not found for Year
2 to 3, Year 3 to 4 or Year 5 to 6.

The null hypothesis
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that, "There will be no significant difference in the
number of times that compulsory arbitration is used,
from one year to the next" would be retained for these
years.
A significant difference did occur between Year 1
to 2 and Year 4 to 5.

This would mean a rejection of

the null hypothesis, and acceptance of the alternative
hypothesis that, "There is a significant difference in
the number of times compulsory arbitration was used" for
the years 1979-80 to 80-81 and 1983-84 to 84-85.
Question B used the same summation formula for the
six year total and the same Chi square test for the year
to year comparisons.
Question B asks if there has been a change in the
number of collective bargaining agreements settled
without the use of any impasse procedure since passage
of legislation providing for compulsory arbitration.
To compare Chi square at the

.05 with 5 degrees

of freedom, the test would have to produce a value
greater than 11.070 to denote that a statistically
significant difference existed.

The test value was

8.329 showing non significance and acceptance of the
null hypothesis for the six year total.
Next, the second set of Chi square tests were
performed on the data using a 2X2 contingency table to
test for any significant differences that may have

F
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occurred on a year to year basis.

Those results are

shown in Table 3.

Table 3
RESULTS OF CHI SQUARE 2X2 CONTINGENCY TABLE ON THE
NUMBER OF TIMES NO IMPASSE PROCEDURE HAS BEEN USED
TO COME TO A CONTRACT

AGREEMENT

Year 1

to 2 (1979-80 to 80-81)

0.307

Year 2

to 3 (1980-81 to 81-82)

0.00301

Year 3 to 4 (1981-82 to 82-83)

4.279*

Year 4 to 5 (1982-83 to 83-84)

3.471

Year 5 to 6 (1983-84 to 84-85)

2.398

(note:]2^= 3.841, df = 1,

.05)

*significant at .05
In testing for statistical significance from year
to year, none was found for the years (Year 1 to 2, Year
2 to 3, Year 4 to 5 and Year 5 to 6).

Therefore, the

null hypothesis that, "There has not been a change in
the number of collective bargaining agreements settled
without the use of an impasse procedure since passage of
legislation for compulsory arbitration" would be
accepted for the six year total and also for the above
mentioned years.

A significant diference did occur

between Year 3 and 4.

Therefore, an alternative

hypothesis of, "There has been a change in the number of
collective bargaining agreements settled without the use

:
•'
■ '
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of an impasse procedure", would be accepted for the
period from 1981-82 to 1982-83.
Question D then asks, "Have more negotiation
impasses been settled at a preliminary step in the
impasse procedure (mediation) rather than continuing to
compulsory arbitration since passage of legislation
providing for compulsory arbitration?
The summation formula was used to determine a Chi
square value for the six year totals.

To compare Chi

square at°<..05 with 5 degrees of freedom, the test
would have to produce a value greater than 11.070 to
denote statistical significance.

The test value was

3.841 indicating no statistically significant difference
in the use of mediation and arbitration as means of
settling impasse disputes over the total six year
period.
The second set of Chi square tests were performed
using a 2X2 contingency table to test for any possible
statistically significant differences from year to year.
Those results are shown in Table 4.

Table 4
RESULTS OF CHI SQUARE 2X2 CONTINGENCY TABLE ON THE
NUMBER OF TIMES MEDIATION/ARBITRATION HAS BEEN USED
TO COME TO CONTRACT AGREEMENT
Year 1 to 2 (1979-80 to 80-81)

6.728*
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Year 2 to 3 (1980-81 to 81-82)

0.745

Year 3

to 4 (1981-82 to 82-83)

0.0237

Year 4

to 5 (1982-83 to 83-84)

3.513

Year 5

to 6 (1983-84 to 84-85)

0.106

(note:

= 3.841, df = 1, << .05)

♦significant at .05
Testing from one year to the next shows no
significant difference for the years Year 2 to 3, Year 3
to 4, Year 4 to 5 and Year 5 to 6.

The null hypothesis

that, "There is no significant difference in the number
of impasses settled at the preliminary step of mediation
in the impasse procedure" is retained for the
abovementioned years.

A significant difference was

found between Year 1 to 2.

In this instance, the

alternative hypothesis of, "There is a significant
difference in the number of impasses settled at the
preliminary step of mediation in the impasse procedure"
would apply for the years 1979-80 to 80-81.
Question C asks if there had been a change in the
average number of issues taken to arbitration from one
year to the next since passage of legislation providing
for compulsory arbitration?
The following t test was used comparing Year 1 to
2, Year 2 to 3, Year 3 to 4 and so on:
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The formula used to obtain degrees of freedom is:

df =

n

i

n

Results of the t tests are found in Table 5.

Table 5
T TEST RESULTS OP THE MEAN NUMBER OP ISSUES TAKEN TO
ARBITRATION FOR THE YEARS 1979-80 THROUGH 1984-85
t value

Year

df

P

1 to 2 (79-80 to 80-81)

1.7091

55.3

0.0930

2 to 3 (80-81 to 81-82)

1.0470

32.4

0.3029

3 to 4 (81-82 to 82-83)

-2.2384

48.9

0.0298*

4 to 5 (82-83 to 83-84)

1.7556

56.5

0.0846

*significant at .05
No statistically significant difference was found
at the ^

.05 level for Year 1 to 2, Year 2 to 3, or Year

4 to 5, and the null hypothesis that, "There is no
significant difference between the mean number of issues
taken to arbitration" would be retained.

F

A significant

“'
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difference was found from Year 3 to 4.

This would

result in accepting the alternative hypothesis that,
"There is a significant difference between the mean
number of issues taken to arbitration" for the years
1981-82 to 82-83.
A different type of t test had to be performed on
the results from Year 5 to 6 because of equal variances.
The t test used to compare those years is:
x - x
t (n + n - 2 df)
1

2

In Year 5 to 6, the t value was -0.0433 with 49
degrees of freedom and p = 0.9657.

In order to be

statistically significant, the p value would have to be
less than .05.

Results show that there was no

statistically significant difference, so the null
hypothesis would also be retained for the years 1983-84
to 84-85.
In Question E , districts were examined to determine
if a trend seemed to be developing with the use of the
arbitration procedure.

Table 6 shows a breakdown of how

many districts went to arbitration and repeated it after
an initial experience with the process.

F
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Table 6
FREQUENCY OF DISTRICTS UTILIZING ARBITRATION FROM
1979-80 THROUGH 1984-85
Year of first arbitration

Times to
79-80

80-81

81-82

82-83

83-84

84-85

1

9

8

8

7

3

7

2

12

9

9

1

1

0

3

15

4

2

0

0

0

4

2

0

0

0

0

0

5

1

0

0

0

0

0

arbitration

Observation of the data indicates that no trend
appears to be evident in the year to year use of the
arbitration procedure.
Question F , asks if one type of issue is taken to
compulsory arbitration more often than any other.

Table

7 shows each of the twenty-three issue areas, and gives
totals for the number of times each area was arbitrated
over the six year period.

Table 7
TOTAL NUMBER OF ISSUES ARBITRATED FOR EACH AREA
FOR THE YEARS 1979-80 THROUGH 1984-85
Issue

Year
79-80 80-81 81-82 82-83 83-84 84-85

Salary

F-------------------

63

22

28

51

31

29

"'
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30

10

16

19

59.5

10

25

9

6

21.5

5

5

14

6

2

8

1

2

Ex tracurricular

28

7

9

24

13

4

Athletic

27

6

7

16.5

5

5

3

0

2

2

1

0

Dept. head/Co-or.

25

8

7

18.5

12

3

Sum. sch/homebound

40

8

5

20

7

1

7

5

0

11

1

8

Longevity

11

2

3

12

4

7

Assignments

27

6

4

5

2

6

6

1

3

2

1

2

Work day/year

70

17

12

42

23

26

Class size

10

5

2

8

1

12

Leaves

55

27

18

24

4

6

Reduction/recall

15

7

13

27

2

3

0

1

1

0

1

0

Duration

13

3

5

4

2

5

Dues deduction

16

14

12

7

1

1

Grievance

45

6

0

12

1

0

Miscellaeous

49

16

16

31

13

21

Salary scale

72

12

2

Medical insurance

46

14

Dental insurance

22

Life insurance

Severance pay

Early retirement

Evaluation

Curriculum

A one way analysis of variance was performed on the
data for the totals for the six year period to determine
if there was a statistically significant difference
between the type of issue and how often that issue went

W
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to arbitration.
0.001.

An F value of 4.23 was found with p =

Results were found to be significant, so a post

hoc Least Significant Difference (LSD) test of multiple
comparisons was performed to determine between which
issues the difference did occur.

The LSD was chosen

because it controls the Type I comparisonwise error
rate.
Statistical significant differences were found
between the following issues:
The number of times that salary was arbitrated was
significant when compared to the frequency of use for
eighteen other issues which included, dental insurance,
life insurance, extracurricular, athletic, severance
pay, department head/co-ordinator, summer
school/homebound, early retirement, longevity,
assignments, evaluations, class size, leaves, reduction
and recall, curriculum, duration, dues deduction and
grievance.
A significant difference was also found between the
number of times that workday/workyear was an issue of
arbitration when compared to seventeen areas which
included, dental insurance, life insurance,
extracurricular, athletic, severance pay, department
head/co-ordinator, summer school/homebound, early
retirement, longevity, assignments, evaluations, class
size, reduction and recall, curriculum, duration, dues

F
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deduction and grievance.
Significant differences occurred between the
frequency with which medical insurance was arbitrated
and the areas of dental insurance, life insurance,
extracurricular, athletic, severance pay, department
head/co-ordinator, summer school/homebound, early
retirement, longevity, assignments, evaluations, class
size, reduction and recall, curriculum, duration, dues
deduction and grievance.
Significant differences also occurred between
miscellaneous issues and the areas of life insurance,
severance pay, early retirement, longevity, assignments,
evaluations, class size, curriculum, duration and dues
deduction.

The number of times that leaves of absence

was an issue for arbitration was found to be significant
to the areas of life insurance, severance pay, early
retirement, longevity, assignments, evaluations, class
size, curriculum duration, dues deduction, athletic and
grievance.
An alternative hypothesis of, "There is a
significant difference in the area of issue and the
number of times it is arbitrated" would be accepted for
the abovementioned areas.

All other comparisons between

issues were found to be non significant at <=<.05,
retaining the null hypothesis that, "There is no
significant difference in the area of issue and the

F

'
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number of times it is arbitrated."
Question G asks if arbitrators rule for the board
or the association's position more often in compulsory
arbitration decisions over the six year period following
enactment of legislation providing for compulsory
arbitration.
Data for the total number of issues decided in
favor of the board and the association for each of the
years being examined is found in Table 8.

Table 8
YEARLY TOTALS OF ISSUES DECIDED FOR
BOARD AND ASSOCIATION
Year

Board

Association

1979-80

385

282

1980-81

115

87

1981-82

86

90

1982-83

229

207

1983-84

81

70

1984-85

94

93

A t test was performed on the data for individual
years and the total six year period to test for
statistical significance.

The formula used was the same

as that used to test for statistical significance in
Question C.

F

The results of that test are found in Table

: ..................
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9.

Table 9
T TEST RESULTS ON ARBITRATOR DECISIONS FOR
BOARD/ASSOCIATION FOR THE YEARS 1979-80 THROUGH 1984-85
1979-80

0.2597

1980-81

0.2704

1981-82

0.8929

1982-83

0.7194

1983-84

0.7276

1984-85

0.9781

(note: a t value of less than°<.05 was needed to reject
the null hypothesis)
*significant at .05
Results of the t tests found that there was no
statistically significant difference for the years 197980, 1980-81, 1981-82, 1982-83, 1983-84 and 1984-85.
Additionally, the t test combining the six year total
produced a t value of 0.6686 and showed no significant
difference.

These results would mean the null

hypothesis that, "There is no significant difference in
the number of times an arbitrator decided in favor of a
particular party in compulsory arbitration procedures"
would be retained for all of the years examined.
Finally, Question H examined whether the category of
the issue of impasse was independent of the arbitrators'

w
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deciding in favor of the board or the association.
Table 10 shows the number of times each area of issue
was decided for the board and the association for the
years 1979-80 through 1984-85.
Table 10
YEARLY TOTALS OF ISSUES DECIDED FOR THE BOARD (B)
AND THE ASSOCIATION (A)

1979--80

F

'

(B)

(A)

1980--81
(B)

(A)

1.

Salary

17

49

8

14

2.

Salary scale

40

32

7

5

3.

Medical insurance

23

23

8

6

4.

Dental insurance

11

11

7

2

5.

Life insurance

9

5

3

3

6.

Ex tracurricular

16

12

5

2

7.

Athletic

22

5

4

2

8.

Severance pay

2

1

0

0

9.

Dept, head/co.ordinator

23

2

3

5

10.

Summer school/homebound

26

14

3

5

11.

Early retirement

7

0

5

0

12.

Longevity

8

3

2

0

13.

Assignments

14

13

3

3

14.

Evaluations

4

2

0

1

15.

Workday/year

61

9

9

8

16.

Class size

9

1

5

0

.
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32

23

15

12

Reduction and recall

6

9

6

1

19.

Curriculum

0

0

1

0

20.

Duration

4

9

2

1

to

Dues deduction

12

4

6

8

22.

Grievance

15

30

3

3

23.

Miscellaneous

24

25

10

6

Leaves of absence

18.

•

17.

1981-82
(B)

1982-83

(A)

(B)

(A)

1983-84

1984-85

(B)

(A)

(B)

(A)

1.

8

20

11

40

7

24

4

25

2.

1

1

16

14

1

9

9

7

3.

14

5

32

27.5

4

6

12

13

4.

5

1

11

10.5

5

0

0

5

5.

2

0

7

1

1

0

1

1

6.

5

4

21

3

10

3

1

3

7.

3

4

9.5

7

3

2

2

3

8.

•1

1

2

0

1

0

0

0

9.

6

1

13.5

5

9

3

2

1

10.

3

2

11

9

3

4

0

1

11.

0

0

8

3

1

0

7

1

12.

1

2

8

4

4

0

5

2

13.

3

1

1

4

2

0

6

0

14.

0

3

2

0

0

1

0

2

15.

7

5

24

18

15

8

16

10

16.

2

0

8

0

1

0

11

1

17.

8

10

10

14

2

2

4

2
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18.

2

11

12

15

1

1

2

1

19.

1

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

20.

2

3

1

3

1

1

0

5

21.

1

11

1

6

1

0

0

1

22.

0

0

2

10

0

1

0

0

23.

11

5

18

13

8

5

12

21

Initially, a one way analysis of 'variance was
performed to determine if any statistically significant
difference occurred between the area of issue and the
arbitral decision (board or association).

Results

showed an F value of 4.23 with p = 0.001.

This

indicated that a statistically significant difference
did exist.

The Least Significant Difference (LSD) test

for multiple comparisons was then performed to determine
where a decision for the board or association was
effected by the type of issue being arbitrated.

A

difference was found to exist when two issues were
arbitrated, salary and workday/year.
Therefore, the alternative hypothesis that, "There
is a statistically significant difference in the number
of times arbitrators decided in favor of a particular
party in compulsory arbitration procedures" would be
accepted for the areas of salary and workday/year for
the six year period being examined with decisions in the
area of salary being favorable for the association and
those for workday/year being favorable for the board.
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Review of Interviews

Interviews were conducted with nineteen individuals
who were presently serving as arbitrators for public
education disputes in Connecticut.

In addition to the

arbitrators, persons representing organizations directly
involved with the compulsory arbitration process in
Connecticut

Department of Education, Connecticut

Education Association (CEA), Connecticut Association of
Boards of Education (CABE) and the American Federation
of Teachers (AFT) were interviewed.

The interviews

consisted of questions that dealt with the individuals'
perceptions of the process and how it has worked since
its inception in 1979.
Initially, individuals were contacted to see if
they would be willing to participate.

Upon agreement to

participate, a set of interview questions were forwarded
to the participants for their review prior to the actual
interview.

Interviews were conducted by telephone

because of distance and the scheduling of convenient
times for the participants.

The interview consisted

of eight questions with interviews lasting from 20
minutes to one hour and 15 minutes in length.
The eight interview questions will first be
examined individually in regard to how they were
answered by members of the arbitration panel.

W

Members

'
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of the panel included individuals representing the
exclusive interests of boards of education, individuals
representing the exclusive interests of employee
organizations and individuals representing the interests
of the public.

There were 21 arbitrators sitting on the

panel at the time of the interviews, with seven
representing each of the three groups.

Two of the 21

individuals were unable to participate in the interview
process.
After looking at the responses on a question by
question basis, conclusions will be incorporated into
the final chapter of the study.

Question # 1 :

How many years have you been involved in

the compulsory arbitration process in Connecticut?
what capacity?

In

Approximately how many compulsory

arbitration procedures have you been directly involved
in?

The number of years that individuals had sat on the
arbitration panel varied from two years to eight years,
(since the inception of the process in 1979).

Each of

the three representative groups had individuals who were
on the initial board appointed by Governor Ella Grasso
in 1979.

Others had been appointed at later dates due

to openings on the panel which had resulted from deaths.
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failure to be reappointed to the panel or individual
withdrawal from the panel.
Some individuals had taken part in over 100
hearings, a few had participated in only a limited
number of hearings and many had taken part in 20 to 50
hearings.

Numbers here would also be effected by the

number of years an individual had served on the panel.

(Note:

The following responses were made by arbitrators

representing the three groups (public interests, boards
of education, and employee organization).

Responses

will be noted from each of the arbitrators but not for
every question asked.

Question # 2 :

What occurrences do you believe were

responsible for the move to enact legislation for
compulsory arbitration?

Every respondent mentioned the occurrence of
previous teacher strikes (strikes were and still are
illegal in Connecticut) that had taken place in
Connecticut, and that the general feeling was that
something had to be done to eliminate those strikes.
Major strikes had occurred in a number of towns and
cities, most notably New Haven and Bridgeport.

The

Bridgeport strike was noted by many as being the "straw

W

.....
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that broke the camel's back."
When responding to the question on what occurrences
were believed responsible for the move to enact
compulsory arbitration legislation, some arbitrator
statements were:
— "I think they just wanted to prevent strikes."
— "Strikes.

A strike before in Shelton, but one in

Bridgeport that triggered it.
things went on before that.

Obviously, a lot of
The attitude of collective

bargaining was not good."
— "Primarily, teacher strikes, were the biggest thing,
and the "impetus for this law."

A number of teacher

strikes in the 70's, mainly the strike in Bridgeport,
where the daughter of the mayor was one of the teachers
on strike.

Needed finality to the process."

— In the late 70's there was a nasty strike in
Bridgeport.

Some teachers were put in the "slammer".

The result was "cloba" (compulsory last best offer
binding arbitration)."
— "I think the immediate motivating act was the
Bridgeport teachers' strike that resulted in the jailing
of teachers, including many elderly teachers."

According to Department of Education statistics, 52
teacher strikes have taken place in Connecticut from
1946-47 through 1986-87.

W

-

The majority of those strikes

..
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took place during the 1970's.

Bridgeport was the next

to the last strike that had taken place in the state.

A

strike occurred in Southington during the 1979-80
schoolyear.

The strike occurred after the bill was

accepted but was not covered by the act because contract
negotiations had begun prior to enactment of the act.
The Bridgeport teachers' strike of 1978 brought
national attention to the city of Bridgeport and its
public school system when more than 200 teachers were
jailed after their refusal to go back to work when
contract negotiations with the city came to an impasse.
The following gives a brief historical background of
that strike.
In speaking with the Connecticut Education
Association representative for the teachers of
Bridgeport during the 1978 strike, the events that led
up to the strike were the preceding contracts in which
teachers did not feel that they were getting a
reasonable wage.

Two years prior to the strike in

Bridgeport a strike vote had been taken but teachers did
not strike because the city was in a financial crisis.
During the present session of negotiations, after being
denied a raise, teachers felt that the strike was their
only recourse and that it was morally right.

The major

issues in dispute were salary and preparation time for
elementary school teachers.

F

— .
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During this strike, 274 teachers were incarcerated
for some period of time.

The first incarcerations took

place when the executive board and negotiations
committee for the teacher organization were in court and
asked to go back to work.

When they said that they

would not, they were handcuffed and taken to jail.

The

women were taken to Niantic (the only maximum security
prison which accepted women and was located about one
hour from Bridgeport).

They were taken to Niantic,

processed with other prisoners, given prison garb and
taken to a dormitory section of the prison (which was
located away from the other prisoners).

The men were

jailed at Whalley Avenue in New Haven.
The following day the executive board and
negotiations committee were taken from maximum security
and placed at Camp Hartell, a National Guard Camp
outside of Windsor Lock, Connecticut and near Bradley
Airport.

The camp had previously been closed but was

reopened and the individuals were placed under guard
there.
At the same time that this was happening, a group
of approximately 50 teachers were in court in
Bridgeport.

They too were asked to go back to work.

When they refused, they were handcuffed and sent to Camp
Hartell.

This second jailing is the one that hit the

headlines with a picture of a "sixty-seven year old

w
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elementary teacher being taken to jail in handcuffs".
The story received national media coverage.
There were additional jailings after this.

The

time spent in confinement varied from 13 days for the
executive board and negotiations committee to lesser
amounts for other groups taken to Camp Hartell.

A total

of 274 teachers were incarcerated for some time during
the strike.
Negotiations were going on throughout this time
period.

Meanwhile, there were demonstrations by the

Connecticut Education Association (CEA} with locals from
throughout the state demonstrating at Camp Hartell
daily.
Initially, there was an attempt to keep the schools
open.

They were opened for the first two days of the

strike and then closed for its remainder.
Most of the negotiations were behind the scenes.
Meetings took place with Governor Grasso and finally the
State Labor Board intervened.

Commissioner Reilly

negotiated with the groups at the State Labor Board (a
24 hour bargaining session) and after that settlement
was reached.
When voting on the proposal, a vote was first taken
by the teachers who were then incarcerated at Camp
Hartell.

If the terms were agreeable to them, a second

vote was to take place with the remainder of the

F
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membership.

One vote was taken at Camp Hartell and one

vote was taken in Bridgeport.

Finally, after a 48 hour

non stop negotiations/voting session everyone, including
those from Camp Hartell, met at Klein Memorial.
When the Bridgeport teachers look at the role their
strike played in moving toward legislation for
compulsory arbitration, they feel that at the time the
strike vote was taken any proposed legislation for
binding arbitration was the
minds.

They were

furtherest thing from their

on strike because of the local

Bridgeport situation.
During and after the strike, community feelings for
the teachers were

positive.

A rapport built up between

the community and

the teachers, and in proceeding years

the groups worked together on issues of concern.

The

most difficult factor to be dealt with after the strike
was the internal strife.

Some asked, for example, "Why

did I have to go to jail and you didn't?"

Some

individuals felt that they were put in jeopardy by going
to jail, and others who didn't want to take the step
still reaped the benefits.

There are accordingly

individuals who still have not returned to the
mainstream as a result of that inner discord.
The climate of collective bargaining in Bridgeport
changed as a result of the strike.

The teacher

organization went to binding arbitration for the three
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following contracts and the first time that settlement
was reached between the parties since that time was
during the 1986-87 negotiations.

J. Rosenberg (personal

communication, June 16, 1987).

Question #3:

What is your opinion of the present

compulsory arbitration legislation?

Strengths?

— "It seems sound and constitutional, and there has been
no successful legal effort to eliminate the statute on
the constitution."
— "It depends on what one wants to achieve.

If one

wants to achieve elimination of strikes, it does that.
It speeds up resolution."
— "All disputes get settled.

No lost time.

Gets rid of

unreasonable demands."
— “When the law was enacted, it was done with firm
timetables and it was tied into the budget process."
— "It brought some labor peace.

We do have closure to

the process of collective bargaining, which has a
positive impact on school boards' ability to budget."
— "I'm not sure that the legislation itself has
strengths.

The principle strength has not necessarily

been the format but the fact that Connecticut used to
have strikes and we haven't had any since the
legislation was introduced."
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— "The ability to resolve disputes, that's its strength.
Strengths are inherent in the process.

The participants

are well qualified. Now there is an attitude that we
don't have to become enemies.

If we don't resolve

difficulties the arbitrators will.

It takes pressure

off of the parties."
— "It provides finality.

An "escape valve" for both

parties so that both can express themselves in a due
process forum."
— "I think the greatest strength is that it is
overwhelmingly accepted by the community itself."

Responses to the first part of the question which
dealt with the strengths of compulsory arbitration
legislation resulted in a number of different areas
being addressed.
Arbitrators frequently mentioned the finality of
the compulsory arbitration process.

This finality or

closure to an impasse provides boards of education with
a contract prior to the budget submission date.
Arbitrators also stated that the legislation has
eliminated strikes and stalemates that interfere with
the educational process.

Time was a third factor that

arbitrators spoke of, with a timetable and strict
timelines speeding up the resolution process.

Two

interesting strengths that were found to be inherent in

“

'
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the process were the quality of those participating in
the arbitration procedure and the acceptance of the
procedure by the community.

Question # 3 :

What is your opinion of the present

compulsory arbitration legislation?

Weaknesses?

— "The short time frame for the arbitration process and
a longer time for negotiations.

There is

procrastination down to the wire and then the arbitrator
has to decide bing bing."
— "It does not provide home rule."
— "Compensation has increased dramatically.
of managerial perogatives get eroded away.

Also, a lot
A self

fulfilling prophecy in that all labor contracts have the
same things."
— "Process may promote more uniformity than warranted by
different situations."
— "Preserves the status quo and blocks innovation."
— "You have to give up something to get the process,
"control", over the settlement.

The decision is not

made by the bargaining parties."
— "Time constraints.

Everyone complains about

restraints but they get the awards out.

It is only a

possible problem if you are doing a lot of them at the
same time."

W
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— "Balancing with last best offer.

Cases where neither

offer "sits well" with the arbitration panel and they
wish to come up with a compromise."
— "Weaknesses are perceived.

Arbitrators wrote

abbreviated awards and consequently required a statement
of reasons.

As presently constructed the law works

well."

Many responses included references to timelines or
time restrictions.

Under the present procedure,

arbitrators must come to a decision 20 days after the
initial arbitration hearing, with the award (including
narrative) completed five days thereafter.

Some

individuals had also mentioned a weakness that was
previously in the law but had been rectified.

That is,

a statement of reasons as to why a decision is made for
each issue, and what factors were used to come to that
decision (narrative).
Arbitrators also note that compulsory arbitration
takes away the teacher/board bargaining and gives the
decision making to a third party rather than having the
bargaining parties control their own destiny.

Another

limitation mentioned was the uniformity of contracts
that has developed over time, with little innovation
being adopted in the area of contract language.

F
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Question # 3 :

What is your opinion of the present

compulsory arbitration legislation?

Effectiveness?

— "Basically, it works."
— "Number of arbitrations declining, except 1986 - 87
Enhancement Act reopeners.

Continued decline would

indicate success."
— "Works out very well from the employees' point of
view.

Fills the gap that voluntary arbitration brings."

— "One-hundred percent effective.

Ends the impasse and

there have been no teacher strikes in Connecticut since
the binding arbitration law was enacted."
— "It's been effective if an object was to avoid
strikes.

We have had none since the legislation."

— "Modified somewhat because arbitrators are
conservative.

Initially, teacher unions rushing into

binding arbitration; as reality set in we got into more
collective bargaining."

Arbitrators felt that if an objective of the
legislation was to prevent teacher strikes, it has
indeed done so because none have occurred since
enactment of the act.

Its effectiveness is also

conveyed by the fact that it works and fills the gap
that existed with voluntary arbitration which was not
mandated.
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Question # 3 :

What is your opinion of the present

compulsory arbitration legislation?

Suggestions for

change?

— "Statutory criteria tend to have effect of benefiting
teacher unions.

Basically, comparability factors look

at what towns settled earlier and a domino effect
occurs.

Maybe certain criteria should be given

priority."
— "Maybe more time for arbitration than for
negotiations."
— "Where parties are in agreement stipulation should be
mandated."
— "This year you were given three neutrals, each side
gets to cross one off.

I don't like that.

You used to

have two parties talk and jockey around and decide who
you wanted as the third arbitrator.

Now they give you

three names and they all may be unacceptable."

(note:

This changed back to the two sides choosing the third
arbitrator in June, 1987, after this interview was
completed).
— "Law should be modified to allow legislative bodies of
communities to have some input."
— "Relax time constraints."
— "None, except to make hours of the workday for
teachers a mandatory subject for negotiations."

F
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Hours became a mandatory item for bargaining in June,
1987, after this interview was completed).
— "I believe interim bargaining should be added to the
act."

(note:

Interim bargaining became effective in

June, 1987, after this interview was completed).
— " A catchall is needed for something that doesn't fit
into the other categories like "such other evidence
deemed relevant by the arbitrators" when making a
decision."

It is interesting to note that some of the areas
that arbitrators had suggested for change actually were
changed during the Legislature's June, 1987 session.
Those areas included the choosing of a third arbitrator,
the inclusion of hours as a mandatory subject of
bargaining and interim bargaining.
Arbitrators were also concerned with the strict
timelines that must be adhered to once arbitration
begins.

Additional concerns that stipulated agreements

should be mandated as such when the parties agree to
them and that the factors used to determine an award be
constructed to include an additional category which
would allow arbitrators to include information that may
be of great value although it might not specifically fit
into one of the other criteria provided under the law,
were also voiced.

Finally, some individuals felt that
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the legislative bodies of towns should have some input
into the arbitration process.

Question # 4 :

What is you opinion of the availability

of compulsory arbitration for settling impasse disputes?

— "There ought to be some method of settling
disagreements through negotiations with the help of
mediation or conciliation."
— "There seems to be more of an effort to settle these
things than before."
— "The imbalance of the arbitration process is a good
thing because strikes are eliminated.
arbitration didn't work.

Advisory

The main advantage of

compulsory arbitration is that, "it's a hammer up
against a brick wall and be ready for it"."
— "Some groups use it time and time again.

In a couple

places in large cities or where there is a history of
trouble with the town they will arbitrate because the
town can't turn it down."
— "Good question.
unit.

It will depend on each individual

If the leadership of a union or board of

education is more comfortable with arbitration than
sitting down it will be used more often.

I think it is

dictated by the players in the community rather than the
arbitration process itself."
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— "Very available.

Negotiations are on a timetable and

tied to board's fiscal year."

Arbitrators viewed availability in two respects.
One is that with its use one has to look at the parties
involved and the past history of collective bargaining
to see if arbitration's availability is viewed of as
something which eliminates the problem of having a
contract rejected.

Others saw it as available because

it is part of a process with strict timelines, which at
times encourage parties to make an effort to settle
their differences.

Question # 5 ;

How have the bargaining parties responded

to compulsory arbitration as a means of settling impasse
disputes?

— "The parties have willingly accepted the results of
the arbitration award."
— "There is less fooling around and posturing."
— "It really becomes a factor in the bargaining process.
I think that there is a reason for both sides to like
the process and that reason is that it offers them a
means of reaching an end.

It gives us a comfortable

feeling of dealing with one another.

Probably why we in

the process all get along pretty well."

F
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— "Initially, great hostility on the part of school
boards.

It is getting sophisticated and generally

accepted with the positive improvement."
— "Unions, with general enthusiasm.

Boards, with

challenges, reluctance, belief that settlements are more
costly."
— "Generally speaking teachers responded favorably
through CEA.
favor it.

In philosophy, the Federation did not

Proponderence of teachers supported binding

arbitration and did everything they could.

Boards of

education are basically at issue with the presumption
that arbitrators would intrude on the legal perogatives
of the school board, (DeCourcy)."
— "It has accelerated the responses of school boards.
Before they could say g o
side of the coin.

yourself.

Now, the other

School districts accuse teachers of

not bargaining and going to arbitration (because they
know they will be getting the increase offered by the
board or better)."
— "Teachers are certainly favorable.

The first year

they got the increases they wouldn't have gotten
otherwise and they deserved them."

Although initial acceptance of the act was stronger
for teachers, with time, boards of education have also
found greater acceptance in the legislation.

F
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made it easier for sides to settle a dispute when they
are unable to do so on their own and gives them a means
of reaching an end in the negotiations process.

Question # 6 :

Given your experience, how would you

evaluate the use of compulsory arbitration vs. mediation
for settling impasse disputes?

— "As time goes on solving more at mediation.

In 1979

it was a new thing and everyone thought our side is 100%
right, everyone else 100% wrong.
that way.

It didn't work out

In a number of cases, lo and behold, the last

best offer of both sides was the same.

By far, the

mediation stage is where most impasses are solved.

It

creates more intelligent bargaining and the two sides
get closer together."
— "Initially, mediation was very much weakened by
arbitration because unions saw binding arbitration as a
way to get what they wanted.
a

Mediation has come back to

more permanent role."

— "Don't see it as a versus.

It is sequential.

I

believe strongly in mediation."
— "I get the impression more impasses are successfully
mediated than go to arbitration.

My reaction, mediation

is preferred to arbitration because it is voluntary.
With arbitration there is some bitterness afterwards

¥
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because it is put down throats."
— "No versus.

They are not conflicting.

the step before arbitration.

Mediation is

Mediation is good to the

extent that it acts as a "catalyst" to help with
bargaining."
— "I think you'll find most contracts are settled in
mediation.

It's very effective because mediators use

arbitration to settle with the parties.
now than prior to arbitration.

It is stronger

Before nothing would

happen."
— "I don't think mediation works nearly as well as
compulsory arbitration.

Mediation is very weak because

it has no leverage, no way to make or force people to do
something.

The only skill it brings to the process is

creativity and imagination."

Many of the arbitrators' responses dealt with the
strengthening of mediation as a procedure in the impasse
process.

These responses included mentioning the fact

that mediation is a "strong arm" approach and that
negotiations go on around the clock.

Some also

mentioned that mediators use the fact that if no
agreement is met between the parties on their own,
arbitrators will intervene and make the decision for
them.

This differs from mediation's prior role under

advisory arbitration when the arbitral decision was not

F
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mandated.
Some individuals mentioned that it was preferable
for parties to come to agreement in mediation because
results are from the bargaining parties and that
although arbitration may still be necessary, many issues
in dispute can be solved in mediation before going onto
compulsory arbitration.

Question # 7 :

What unanticipated effects of the

legislation have manifest themselves since initiation of
the compulsory arbitration procedure?

— "Use of stipulated awards that forestall, that's the
biggie."
— "I think substantial increases in teacher salaries is
in part tied into arbitration factors.
some outside factors.
rate.

There are also

During early 80's the inflation

After inflation went down, teachers were still

getting salary rates that were high.
been no strikes.
realized.

Also, there have

We were hoping for it and it was

Finally, there has been greater acceptance by

boards of education of the process."
— "I can't think of any.

The impact of Enhancement

Legislation was unanticipated at the time of the
arbitration statute.

Early to say how it interplays

with the process."

F —
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— "It has not resulted in decreasing disparities in
salaries between richer and poorer areas."
— "Depends on who you are.

One thing that I think is

beginning, is an unexpected leveling process because
arbitrators are basically the same people statewide.
What is beginning, throughout the state, is a statewide
salary schedule."
— "The national trend for teacher improvement and salary
increases have made money a non issue during the last
12-16 months."
— "Parties sometimes use binding nature of award (not
subject to challenge by local fiscal authorities) to
disguise a dispute between fiscal authorities on one
hand and the board and union on the other, as a dispute
between board and union when they are really in
agreement."
— "None to my knowledge.

They were all rather candid.

Boards of education, it did exactly what they said would
happen, increases in salaries."
— "The parties have an accordion effect.

When it first

started it was not unusual to have 80-90 issues (ie.
lunch time).

That has come down. The biggest number this

year was 37 or 38.

Boards are now throwing in more

issues to use as bargaining chips because three out of
four times teachers get the salary."
— "Timelines have been modified over the life of the

F
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act.

Geared toward mandated fiscal date for approval of

budgets."

The effects on salary were mentioned by many of
the arbitrators as being unanticipated, be it the fact
that increases were higher than expected, the fact that
a leveling began to occur throughout the state or that
salaries were still thought to be unequal in rich as
opposed to poor areas.

The Education Enhancement Act

and the distribution of large sums of money for teacher
salaries was not anticipated at the onset of the act,
but will no doubt effect it during the next few years,
and perhaps even more so after funding for the act ends
(depending on what type of legislation will be
introduced to take its place).
Arbitrators also did not anticipate the use of the
stipulated award when disagreement was primarily between
the town fiscal authority and the bargaining parties.
They noted that although the process was to prevent
strikes, the fact that none has occurred has been a
surprise because even with the law it was thought that
some groups would still strike.

Question # 8 :

What is your overall assessment of the

practice of compulsory arbitration as you have
experienced it?

F
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modified or (c) eliminated?

The following comments give the arbitrators'
overall assessment of the compulsory arbitration
procedure in Connecticut.

— "Continued.

If eliminated, it is back to producing

teacher strikes.

There should be some method of impasse

resolution and it should foster the procedure to have
parties reach settlement."
— "Continued.

I don't know what modifications can be

made for my limited experience.

There is undue burden

on the neutral arbitrator."
— "Modifications.

Time for writing decisions.

it into the legislation two years ago.

CABE got

The other way

was more convenient."
— "Continued, and despite recommendations I gave earlier
I would rather leave it alone.
you will prevail.

If you have a good case

There is no question that binding

arbitration with timelines means that by February about
every contract is settled.

Others are only unsettled

because they have a later budget submission date."
— "I think that what it has done is a typical response
to a problem.

We are throwing money at the problem.

The bottom line of the compulsory arbitration structure
is to increase the cost of education tremendously.

F
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important, if one tenth the amount of energy was spent
on looking at education itself.

What are we buying with

$50,000 salaries and what is worthwhile to children in
the long educational process?"
— "I thing the law should be continued and modified to
eliminate feigned disputes."
— "Continued because there is no choice.

The

alternative is teacher strikes and that is not viable.
Modify the statutory criteria for rendering awards and
decrease the effect that comparable data have on
rendering an arbitration award.

The statute is well

drafted and has shown that it is working well."
— "It's apparent that it's working.
interest because I am paid.

I have a vested

Continued.

I don't think

that anyone would disagree that it hasn't eliminated
strikes and achieved its purpose.

Modified to give

arbitrators the ability to do something in between.
With extremes neither result is good - too high or low."
— "Continued.

I think it works very nicely.

One of the

few pieces of legislation that works and was
intelligently drafted."
— "I'd continue it.

I'm not sure how modified.

I'd

like to restrict some subjects that go into arbitration.
Don't like the interim bargaining."
— "Modified by the concept if it is done fairly and
justly.

F

The concept is good.

Strikes are bad.

But in
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lean times it will not work."
— "Eliminated or modified along the line of the Canadian
plan (option under this plan is to strike or use binding
arbitration to settle impasses).

Some people are

cautious by nature and want the security blanket of
binding arbitration and there are those who hit the
bricks if there is an impasse."
— "What do you want the labor/management ambiance to be.
I'd be inclined to have some strikes.

Locally,

communities should be able to decide what to do and
teachers should be able to go on strike if they want to.
I'd eliminate it if it were up to me, but in Connecticut
I am a "voice crying in the wilderness".

It is not a

majority point of view."
— "Continued.

I'm an advocate of the whole system

having worked under the old system.

Both sides can be

frustrated at times because you don't always get what
you want, but it leads to bargaining.

It's been

effective and met its goals and objectives."
— "It hasn't made any dramatic changes.
stabilized the process.
realistic.

It has

Timetables could be more

Hours, evaluation procedures and school

calendar should be mandatory."
— "Continued.

I don't think it should be modified much.

Works fine the way it is.
session.

They try to abolish it every

Now there is a pending bill that would deal
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with reopening negotiations during a contract.

Every

once in a while it would be nice to diffuse a problem in
the middle without going through the entire contract.
People will be lured into taking advantage of the above.
This thing is so rigid it makes other things work.
Teacher strikes are not a good thing and its the wrong
kind of business to shut down.”

Arbitrators for the mostpart, advocate continuation
of the compulsory arbitration law with some
modifications.

The addition of more time for writing

awards was a concern of arbitrators, expecially since a
narrative giving reasons for each decision must be
given.

Some individuals would also like to have some

additional items subject to arbitration.

Although a few

arbitrators would like to see the process eliminated,
they do not see that as a possibility, and instead
offered modifications that would make the law more
desirable from their point of view.

American Federation of Teachers
response to interview questions

In speaking with a representative of the American
Federation of Teachers (AFT) who has been involved in
the compulsory arbitration process as an AFT staff

c
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member and as a local teacher bargaining unit president,
the major occurrence which led to legislation for
compulsory arbitration in Connecticut was teacher
strikes, with "the major strike that pushed the
legislation over the barrel" taking place in Bridgeport.
The organization does not see any strengths in the
act but sees in as "a crutch".

The basic weakness being

that sometimes both sides reject a contract because they
"know that they cannot get it through the town fathers"
and instead opt for a stipulated award.

In the area of

effectiveness it was noted that, "you don't have
prolonged negotiations going on forever and forever."
Initially, the availability of compulsory
arbitration was viewed as being "the greatest thing
since sliced bread", but it has been "used as a crutch
to have others make the decision for you."

Contracts

are beginning to have a common denominator, and are
looking the same.
Mediation has become a tool to force settlement and
mediators are now more influential in getting
settlements than they were prior to legislation for
compulsory arbitration.
When looking at the unanticipated effects of the
legislation, "basically a oneness of contract has
manifest itself into teacher contracts in Connecticut"
with contracts sporting the same language, money and

F
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issues.
Finally, the Federation would like to see the act
modified with a limited right to strike, a procedure
"which in Connecticut circles is the Canadian Plan,
because compulsory arbitration is not going to be
eliminated".

Connecticut Association of Boards of Education (CABE)
response to interview questions

The Connecticut Association of Boards of Education
(CABE) representative, who had served as counsel to the
association, noted that the occurrence of several
strikes in major cities (Bridgeport and New Haven) led
to the move for compulsory arbitration legislation in
Connecticut.
In viewing the process its strength was seen as
being that it, "certainly does provide finality to the
process".

That arbitrators "tend to award the going

rate" with settlements at the beginning of the year
becoming the going rate "despite past history and the
financial condition of the community being considered",
was felt to be a major weakness of the legislation.
CABE finds the legislation effective in resolving
disputes but feels that it is a "high price to pay" and
would opt for modifications with finality.

r
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possibility in this area would be to limit the issues
going to arbitration.
In examining how parties have responded to the
procedure, it was noted that in some districts as part
of the strategy, teacher organizations will wait it out
because they do well in arbitration.
In responding to the use of mediation, it was noted
that the success of mediation is something that depends
on the skill of the mediator.
CABE did not see any unanticipated effects of the
legislation, but instead felt that the organization had
anticipated what would happen which they felt resulted
not necessarily in a balance in decisions.
Finally, a first recommendation would be to
eliminate the legislation, but politically speaking it
was not viewed as being a possibility because
Connecticut is a labor intensive state.

Instead,

modifications such as the one calling for a written
narrative (a modification CABE wanted and got into the
law) were suggested.

Also, CABE plans to continue a

lawsuit which was previously dismissed on a
technicality, challenging the constitutionality of the
law.

Connecticut Department of Education
response to interview questions

r
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The Department of Education consultant for
teacher/board negotiations noted that the primary
occurrence that was responsible for the move to enact
compulsory arbitration in Connecticut was the Bridgeport
teachers' strike.

The Connecticut Education Association

(CEA) had been looking for binding arbitration for a
long time and they (CEA) sponsored the bill which then
came to the Education Committee.
Since the law's enactment it has done "what it was
supposed to do, stop strikes."
At the time of the interview the General Assembly
was voting to add hours as a mandatory subject of
bargaining to the bill along with midterm bargaining.
(Both items passed.)
A strength of the procedure from the administrative
perspective of the Commissioner is that "it has resulted
in labor stability in the State of Connecticut since
1979."

There have been several procedural changes in

the law and in 1985 the state Supreme Court found the
statute constitutional.
When viewing how parties have responded to the act
it is seen as being "an act that is fairly
administered."

There is no waving on the statute (i.e.

timetable) and parties appreciate the act because "the
rules of the game don't change because you are in a big

IF
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city versus a small town.”
In viewing the mediation and arbitration procedures
the department notes that there are fewer arbitrations
with more solving of impasse taking place in mediation.
This is in part due to the track record of arbitrators
and conscientious mediators who have enhanced the
success of mediation.

Finally, it was noted that the

law has done what it is supposed to do, and eliminated
the potential riff that can occur in a community.

Connecticut Education Association (CEA)
responses to interview questions

The Connecticut Education Association (CEA)
perspective on the compulsory arbitration process was
presented by its bargaining coordinator who lists the
1978 Bridgeport strike as being the "biggest single
occurrence" which led to the move for compulsory
arbitration legislation in Connecticut.
The CEA views the legislation as being "overall,
the best collective bargaining law in the country."

The

one item mentioned that was missing from the legislation
was the absence of "hours" as a mandatory subject of
bargaining (hours did become a mandatory subject of
bargaining in June, 1987).
The availability of compulsory arbitration is

c
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viewed as being a "tremendous stimulus at the bargaining
table" and mediation which was effective 10% of the time
prior to compulsory arbitration is now effective 50% of
the time.
An unanticipated result of the act was how high
settlements have been.

"We never anticipated the

percentage settlements that we have been getting since
passage of the law.

Although the negative side is that

we thought we would do better on working conditions."
Finally/ it was noted that, "the act has been the
best thing that's ever happened for teacher/board
negotiations in Connecticut and it's been refined enough
that's it's working very well."
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Chapter 6
Conclusions and Recommendations

Examination of statistical data covering the first
six years of the compulsory arbitration process in
Connecticut brought to light some interesting facts
about the process, its usage and arbitral decisions.
Teacher contracts in Connecticut are settled by one
of three means:

(1) In negotiations without the use of

an impasse procedure,
arbitration.

(2) in mediation or (3) in

The following results are from the

analyses of data on usage of the procedures noted above.
Statistical analysis of the data on how teacher
contracts were settled for the 1979-80 through 1984-85
period demonstrated that for the combined six year
period statistical significance occurred with the use of
compulsory arbitration as a means of resolving impasses
between bargaining parties.

Further testing was

conducted on a yearly basis to determine when these
differences might have taken place.

Results showed that

between the years 1979-80 to 1980-81 and 1982-83 to
1983-84, statistically significant differences were
found.

One possible reason for this happening during
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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

the 1979-80 to 1980-81 period is that it was the first
year during which compulsory arbitration was available
under the act and there may have been a tendency for
parties to try out the new procedure during its initial
stage to see how it worked.

The second time that

statistical significance occurred, was between 1982-83
and 1983-84.

This happened after two years during which

no statistical differences occurred.

In this instance,

it is difficult to make any determination on possible
reasons for the difference.

One possibility is that

during that time period, a higher number of full
contracts might have been up for negotiations as opposed
to reopeners from prior contracts dealing with only a
few issues.

Secondly, the procedure may have been

effected by a cyclical process, with a recurrence of
arbitrations in towns that had used arbitration in
earlier years.

No dramatic changes occurred in the

arbitration legislation, nor were there any notable
changes in statewide economic conditions that might have
created the differences from 1982-83 to 1983-84.
The same six year period was examined for any
significant changes in the number of contracts that were
negotiated without the use of any impasse procedure.
Initially, data was examined for the total six year
period.

No statistically significant difference was

evidenced during that time.

F
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completed on the data on a year to year basis.

On a

year to year basis, a significant difference was noted
between the years 1981-82 to 1982-83.
A possible factor contributing to this occurrence
could be that after an initial rush to use the
arbitration process, many parties realized that you
could not only win but lose a decision, bringing about
more of an effort to reach an agreement without the use
of the arbitration process.
A final comparison of frequency of contract
settlement procedures tested for any significant
difference between the use of mediation and arbitration
as the final step in a contract agreement.
No significant difference was found when comparing
the two over the total six year period.

Additionally,

tests were conducted making comparisons on a yearly
basis.

The tests for individual years found that a

significant difference was found during the 1979-80 to
1980-81 period, the first year of the statute's
availability.

This area can be compared to results in

an earlier question which found significance during the
same time period when arbitration was compared to the
other combined means (without impasse and mediation) of
coming to a contract agreement.

Perhaps, as with

anything new, after an initial period of use, parties
began to attempt to do more bargaining on their own.

F ----------
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If one is looking at the use of the arbitration
procedure to see if a "narcotic effect" has occurred
with its usage, you would have to say that none seems
evident.

The use of arbitration as a means of reaching

a contract settlement did not remain statistically
significant when compared with other means of settlement
time and time again.

It would be more prudent to

suggest that there were other reasons for statistical
differences to occur on and off again during the
procedure's first six years in existence.
After comparing the different types of procedures
utilized in reaching contract agreement for public
school teachers, analyses were conducted on the number
and types of issues taken to arbitration.
First, data on the mean number of issues taken to
arbitration was examined to determine if a statistically
significant difference existed with the mean number of
issues taken to arbitration over the six year period.

A

difference was found to occur between 1981-82 to 198283.
Once again, a possible reason for significant
differences in the mean number of issues arbitrated
could be related to the number of full contracts as
opposed to reopeners that were being negotiated for the
period from 1981-82 to 1982-83.
An examination of the frequency with which

F
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districts engaged in the compulsory arbitration process,
shows no apparent trend in the year to year use of
compulsory arbitration.

Initially, the number of

districts using the process was large.

It then leveled

off after the first year with a slight increase during
1982-83.
Another area of statistical questioning addressed
whether certain areas of issues were taken to
arbitration more often than others.

The initial test

for statistical significance demonstrated that a
difference did occur.

Follow up testing was done to

determine between what areas the differences occurred.
In testing between the 23 issues, a significant
difference occurred between how often the issue of
salary was arbitrated when compared to 18 other issue
areas.
Significant differences also occurred when
comparing the frequency of arbitrating issue of
workday/year issues to all areas except salary, salary
scale, medical insurance, leaves and miscellaneous
issues.

While frequency of arbitrating the issue of

medical insurance was statistically significant when
compared to all issue areas except salary, salary scale,
workday/year, leaves and miscellaneous.
A difference also occurred when comparing how
frequently the area of leaves of absence was arbitrated

F
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When compared to 13 other areas. While differences were
statistically significant between miscellaneous issues
and 10 other areas being arbitrated.

There were no

other statistically significant differences evidenced
when comparing other issues to one another.
In looking at the differences that occurred
between miscellaneous issues, it would be difficult to
even attempt to decipher Why those differences might
have occurred.

The miscellaneous category included all

issues that did not fit into one of the 22 other
categories, and served as a catchall for those issues
that could not be placed elsewhere.
In collective bargaining contracts, the major item
being negotiated is usually salary regardless of whether
those negotiating are teachers, policemen or
professional football players.

Therefore, it is not

unusual to have significance occur between salary and a
number of other issue areas.

The same may apply in part

to the areas of medical insurance and leaves, both of
Which could deal with substantial monetary inputs.
In examining the area of workday/year it should be
noted that teacher hours were not a mandatory issue for
bargaining prior to June, 1987.

A number of times the

issue was found to be nonarbitrable under the DeCourcy
decision Cl62 Conn. 566, 295 A.2d 526 (1972)], but was
still admitted as an issue for arbitration because
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nonarbitrability does not prevent an issue from being
placed into arbitration.

For instance, if the teacher

association submitted a last best offer stating that
the workday would begin at 8:00 A.M. and end at 3:00 P.M.
and the board's last best offer was that the issue could
not be arbitrated, under the DeCourcy decision, the
arbitrator(s) would choose the last best offer of the
board.
The next area of testing examined where any
statistically significant differences existed between
the number of times that arbitrator decisions were in
favor of the board or the association.
Test results demonstrated that no statistically
significant differences existed in the arbitrators
deciding issues for the board or the association for the
six years combined.

Additionally, no difference was

evident for the individual years.
The final analysis examined whether the category of
the issue arbitrated was independent of the arbitration
award being in favor of the board of the association.
A statistically significant difference was found to
occur in only two of the 23 categories.
were salary and workday/year.

Those two areas

In the area of salary

arbitrators were more inclined to make decisions in
favor of the associations, while they were more inclined
to make workday/year decisions in favor of the board.
No other significant differences were found when

: ""
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comparing arbitration decision to the area of issue
being arbitrated.
Although an initial response might be to look at
the issue of salary and conclude that arbitrators decide
salary issues in favor of the association, there are
some other factors that must be considered.

One is that

in recent years there has been a move not only in
Connecticut but nationwide to raise teacher salaries to
those comparable with other professions.

A second, is

that the differences between the last best offers of
both groups may have been very close, or in some cases
the same, indicating both sides' realization of the need
for salary increases for teachers, something that was
recognized statewide with the Legislature's move to
raise minimum teacher salaries in 1986.
Likewise, when examining the tendency for
arbitration awards in the area of workday/year to be
made in favor of boards of education, it should be noted
that in relation to items such as teacher hours which
were non arbitrable, the tendency for arbitration panels
to choose the board's position may in part be due to the
fact that the board saw an issue as being non arbitrable
and the panel, in following the guidelines of the lctw
decided in the board's favor.
A review of the interviews which were conducted as
a segment of this study, demonstrated that the

F
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individuals involved in the compulsory arbitration
process in Connecticut are very knowledgable of the
procedure and enjoy their work.
Arbitrators representing each of the three interest
groups recognized and candidly spoke of the
legislation's strengths, weaknesses, effectiveness, and
suggestions for change.

They realized the importance of

collective bargaining between parties and the value of
mediation in acting as a catalyst to aid parties in
coming to a contract settlement.

Many stressed the

importance of parties coming to an agreement on their
own and that arbitration was to be used only when
parties could not come to agreement.
The arbitrators commented on the professionalism of
all of the individuals involved in the process and their
willingness to work together.

The calibre of

individuals along with the strength of the arbitration
legislation together appear to be making the process a
very successful means of resolving impasse disputes in
Connecticut.
One amazing result of the compulsory arbitration
legislation in Connecticut is that no strikes have
occurred since the law's enactment.

Although strikes

have been illegal, that fact had not prevented them from
occurring prior to enactment of the arbitration act.
It is also commendable to note that very few
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arbitration awards have been challenged in the courts.
Moves to vacate the awards, by filing a motion in
superior court within thirty days following receipt of
the award [Conn. Gen. Stat.
have been infrequent.

ss 10-153 f(c) (7) (1983)]

Celentano and Williamson (1985),

note that there were only thirteen motions to vacate
awards (this number also included administrator awards
from a total of 208 arbitrations) in Connecticut during
the first five years of the act.

The fact that a motion

to vacate was seldom initiated suggests that in making
arbitration decisions arbitrators are adhering to the
dictates of the law and are not acting in a way which
would prejudice the substantive rights of the parties.
In looking to the future it would be interesting to
take a continued look at data over the next few years
because of the 1986 Enhancement Act [1986 Conn. Acts 1,
ss (1) (Spec. Sess.)] which raised minimum teacher
salaries to over $20,000.

It will be even more

intriguing to examine the data for possible trends after
allocations for the Enhancement Act are depleted in
1989.

Changes may result, if that time the state

continues to subsidize teacher salaries or give that
responsibility back to the towns.

If that is the case,

it will be interesting to observe how local communities
that are less affluent will meet the monetary demands of
raises that are already set into the teacher salary
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structure because of the Enhancement Act.

Will they

raise taxes or want teachers to take pay cuts (an
unlikely but possible result)?

Presently, the

legislature has voiced that it will aid districts
financially after Enhancement Act funding runs out with
a possible 50-50 funding (a situation in which half of
the funding would come from the state and other half
would come from the municipality) resulting.
In looking at what the sitaution will be a few
years from now, the Department of Education is in the
process of redesigning the formula for the Guaranteed
Tax Base that provides allocations to school districts.
This change is being designed to incorporate money that
was provided under the Enhancement Act into the
Guaranteed Tax Base structure.
After completing this segment of research on
Connecticut's experience with compulsory arbitration,
there are additional areas that should be examined for
possible research development for the future.

One such

area is to examine the administrator groups that are
covered by the arbitration legislation to see what
differences have occurred with their use of the
procedure since they, unlike teachers, are not covered
under the Enhancement Act which provided for minimum
teacher salaries in recent years.

The area of salary

and changes that may take place in the arbitration of

F
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this issue and its effect on teacher salaries prior to,
during and after funding through the Enhancement Act
would give greater insight into the area of compulsory
arbitration and its effect on teacher salaries.
Additionally, in the area of salary research, a study on
the impact of the legislation on town finance boards
would demonstrate how arbitration legislation has affected
the financial situation of individual municipalities.
Another area of interest would involve an
examination of different socio/demographic areas of the
state to determine if any differences occur regarding
the use of the arbitration procedure and the types of
issues arbitrated in those locales.

Also, an examination

of issues that became arbitrable near the conclusion of
this study and their effect on the process in the future
could provide information on the priority with which
parties view different issues being arbitrated.
Finally, a comparative case study of states that
have compulsory v. voluntary arbitration would offer
insight into which type of procedure has proven to be more
beneficial in the resolution of impasse disputes.
In concluding, the compulsory arbitration procedure
appears to be doing quite well as a means of solving
impasse disputes in Connecticut.

It has managed to

bring finality to the bargaining process when parties
are unable to reach a conclusion on their own, and yet
parties do not rely on arbitration as their only means
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of reaching contract agreement.

Boards of education and

teacher organizations still solve the majority of their
contract negotiations before reaching the arbitration
stage.
In looking to the future of collective bargaining,
states that are developing or amending collective
bargaining legislation, along with those that may
presently be using voluntary arbitration or the right to
strike to settle impasse disputes may want to review the
situation in Connecticut to see if a similar procedure
would benefit the educational process in their state.
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Appendix A
Notes from Legislative Hearings

The following cites segments from sessions in the
Connecticut state house and senate prior to voting on
the bill for compulsory arbitration:
During the state senate hearings on Tuesday, May
8, 1979, various amendments were proposed and voted on
concerning Senate Bill 2, An Act Concerning Last Best
Offer Binding Arbitration for Teacher Contract Disputes.
At the inception of the hearing a move was made to,
"remove the bill from debate and action", by Senator
Post, because of "possible conflicts"

(Senator Knows).

Senator Mustone then moved for acceptance of the Joint
Committee's Favorable Report and passage of the bill.
Along with this action, background on the current
law was summarized, concerning the fact that presently,
when a disputed contract between the board of education
and the employees exclusive bargaining unit went to
arbitration, the recommendation would be non binding
while contract settlements that did not go to arbitration
would remain subject to veto by the local or regional
legislative body.

Senate Bill 2 would require that

once a disputed contract was submitted for arbitration
it could no

longer

be rejected by referendum by

the legislative body of the district.
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It was also noted that, as under current law, when
no contract agreement was evident, parties would go to
mediation.

If settlement is not reached four days after

mediation, or on the ninetieth day prior to the budget
submission date the matter goes to arbitration.
Following this discussion, the following amendments to
the bill were introduced:
Senate Amendment Schedule A, offered by Senator
Buzzuto stated that, "any action of the regional board
in terms of its conduct of negotiation, pursuant to
Section 10 - 153 shall be performed within the full
purview of the public."
by Senator Shelly.

The amendment was then opposed

A roll call vote (when 20% of the

membership call for it with a voice vote) was taken on
the amendment.

The results were yea-7, nay-25, with 4

absent from voting.

The amendment failed.

Senate Amendment Schedule B, offered by Senator
Skowronski, was directed toward line 144 and section (c)
2 of the bill.

This amendment would make, "mandatory

that the fiscal authority or the agent of the budgetary
authority appear as part of the board of education
presentation."

(Note:

In Connecticut, the town or

regional legislative body (finance board) and not the
board of education has the authority to raise taxes to
meet school budgets.)
There was a total of 32 voting for Amendment B,
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with 4 members absent.

The motion for the amendment

failed by a vote of yea-12; nay-20.
Senate Amendment Schedule C, which was also offered
by Senator Skowronski, "deletes from the act the use or
employment of a single arbitrator and would provide that
the decision be made by the three member panel."

This

amendment which would eliminate the option of using a
single arbitrator instead of a tripartite board was
defeated by a yea-9; nay-23 vote.
Senate Amendment Schedule D f which was offered by
Senator Schneller would, "restrict last best offer
binding arbitration to those issues that relate to
salaries and fringe benefits."

This amendment failed on

a close vote of yea-15; nay-17.

Therefore, issues being

arbitrated could not be restricted to areas that
involved only salary and fringe benefits.
There were no further amendments to the bill.

A

general discussion followed during which various members
of the senate spoke.
During that discussion Senator Denardis rose in
support of the bill and Senator Matthews rose to oppose
the bill.
The discussion that followed pointed out, that
unlike the municipal employees' act that was found
unconstitutional on three points (standards, the appeal
process and accountability), these points "had been
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addressed in this bill" (Senator Mustone).
Senator Owens then spoke on the number of teacher
strikes that had taken place in the state.

He noted

strikes in Milford, New Britain, New Haven and "fourteen
days of shame" in Bridgeport when 265 teachers were
detained in facilities (Niantic and Camp Hartell), many
for the entire two week period.
Following the discussion, a final vote on Senate
Bill 2 resulted in its passing in the senate by a yea24; nay-8 vote.
The house discussion on Senate Bill 2 An Act
Concerning Last Best Offer Binding Arbitration for
Teacher Contract Disputes began with opening comments by
Representative Henderson, in which he moved for
acceptance of the Joint Committee's Favorable Report of
Senate Bill 2, and passage of the bill in concurrence
with the senate.

In his comments, he stated that this

bill would amend the present Section 10 - 153 of the
statutes and provide a, "finality to the negotiations
process."

He mentioned the Bridgeport strike which

"resulted in over three quarters of a million dollars in
court fines" and gave statistics on the municipal
binding arbitration law which over a three year period
(1975-1978) resulted in 741 negotiated contracts, 8% of
which were referred to arbitration.
Later, some amendments to the bill were proposed
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and voted upon.

They included:

House Amendment Schedule A, presented by
Representative Glassman, "would limit those items for
compulsory binding arbitration to those items which
included salary, fringe benefits and grievance."
A lengthy discussion was given on this amendment
and the fact that there had been 55 teacher strikes in
Connecticut during the prior 14 year period.

The total

number voting on Amendment A was 143, with 72 necessary
for passage.

The amendment, which was very similar to

Amendment D in the senate failed by a close vote of yea69; nay-74, resulting in no restrictions that would
limit the type of issue that could be arbitrated.
A second amendment, House Amendment Schedule B,
offered by Representative Allen was for the, "mandatory
appearance of the fiscal authority."

This amendment was

similar to one proposed in the senate that would mandate
the appearance of arepresentative of the budgetary
authority.

There was an insufficient number of the

membership (less than 20%) requesting a roll call vote,
so a voice vote was taken.

The nays were in the

majority and the amendment failed.
House Amendment Schedule C, to Senate Bill 2 was
adopted and ruled technical.
House Amendment Schedule D, offered by
Representative Berman, would "give the option of the
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right to strike to teachers along with binding
arbitration."

A roll call vote resulted in a yea vote

of 35 and a nay vote of 107.

The amendment failed and

therefore, did not provide the option to strike.
House Amendment Schedule E, offered by
Representative Meyer, would make the arbitration award
subject to a thirty day veto by making changes in line
205, to strike "referendum", line 200, to strike "not
withstanding the provisions of" and the striking of
lines 201 to 204 inclusive.

The yea vote was 62 and the

nay vote was 78, resulting in failure of the amendment's
proposal to make awards subject to veto.
House Amendment Schedule P, offered by
Representative Matties, provided for last best package
offer arbitration by making changes in line 193, to
strike "each individual issue" and to insert in lieu
thereof "all issues".

In line 196 to strike "separately

each individual" and insert in lieu thereof "the" and to
strike "each" and "individual".

There were 22 yea votes

and 118 nay votes and the amendment failed passage, with
the procedure for binding arbitration remaining as an
issue by issue rather than total package procedure.
Prior to a final vote on the bill, Representative
Robertson requested a vote change from the positive to
the negative and Representative Onorato requested a vote
change from the negative to the positive.

¥
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Voting on Senate Bill 2 as amended by House
Amendment C was taken with 70 votes necessary for
passage.

The vote was yea-70? nay-69.

were absent and did not vote.

Twelve members

The bill passed by one

vote and was signed into law.
In effect, the passage of the act resulted in a
piece of legislation that provided compulsory
arbitration for the resolution of impasse disputes on an
issue by issue basis with the strike remaining an
illegal act under the law.

Additionally, issues for

arbitration were not to be limited and in the
arbitration procedure parties could choose a single
arbitrator or a tripartite board to hear and decide the
arbitration cases.
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Appendix B
ARBITRATION DECISIONS
1979-80 through 1984-85
ARBITRATION DECISIONS
1979-80
Town

Issue

Board

Association

DERBY
Stipulated Agreement

BROOKFIELD
Salary
Salary scale
Medical ins.
Dental ins.
Life ins.
Ex tracurricular
Siam, sch./homebound
Longevity
Assignments
Class size
Leaves
Reduction/recall
Duration
Grievance
Miscellaneous

0
2
2
1
0
0
0
.0
2
1
12
1
0
0
2

2
11
4
0
1
2
2
1
0
0
6
0
2
12
4

Subtotal

25

50

Salary
Dental ins.
Workday/year
Duration

0
3
0
1

2
0
1
0

MERIDEN

Subtotal

TRUMBALL

F
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Salary
Workday/year

1

Subtotal

1

Salary
Medical ins.
Dental ins.
Sum. sch./homebound
Longevity

0
1
0
3
1

Subtotal

5

3
0

MILFORD
2
0
1
0
0

NORTH STONINGTON
1
0

0
1

Salary
Salary scale
Medical ins.
Dental ins.
Life ins.
Sum. sch./homebound

0
1
0
1
1
1

2
0
1
0
0
0

Subtotal

4

Salary
Salary scale
Extracurricular
Sum. sch./homebound

1
2
1
1

Subtotal

6

Salary
Salary scale
Subtotal

WOODRIDGE

STAFFORD
1
3
0
0

DANBURY
Salary
Salary scale
Medical ins.

0
21
3

6
7
7

r
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Dental ins.
Life ins.
Ex tracurricular
Athletic
Severance pay
Dept. head/Co-or.
Sum. sch./homebound
Early retirement
Longevity
Assignments
Evaluations
Workday/year
Class size
Leaves
Reduction/recall
Curriculum
Duration
Dues deduction
Grievance
Miscellaneous

0
2
0
2
0
1
2
1
1
3
0
11
3
11
2
0
0
0
1
8

1
0
1
0
0
0
3
0
0
6
1
3
0
11
8
0
1
2
14
7

Subtotal

72

78

NEW CANAAN
Stipulated Agreement

VERNON
Salary
Salary scale
Medical ins.
Extracurricular
Dept. head/Co-or.
Reduction/recall
Grievance
Miscellaneous

0
1
1
0
0
1
0
2

3
0
0
1
1
0
1
1

Subtotal

5

7

Salary
Duration

0
1

3
0

Subtotal

1

3

GRISWOLD

MANCHESTER
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Salary
Salary scale
Medical ins.
Dental ins.
Dept. head/Co-or.
Assignments
Workday/year
Class size
Dues deduction
Grievance
Miscellaneous

1
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
1

1
1
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
1

Subtotal

8

6

NORWICH FREE ACADEMY
Stipulated Agreement

THOMPSON
Stipulated Agreement

NEWTOWN
Salary
Salary scale
Medical ins.
Dental ins.
Life ins.
Extracurricular
Athletic
Dept. head/Co-or.
Sum. sch./homebound
Evaluations
Workday/year
Duration
Dues deduction

1
0
0
0
1
4
4
5
3
1
1
0
1

2
2
2
2
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
1
0

21

11

Salary

1

0

Subtotal

1

0

Subtotal

PUTNAM

f
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WILTON
Salary
Longevity

0
1

2
0

Subtotal

1

2

Dues deduction

1

0

Subtotal

1

0

Salary
Medical ins.
Dental ins.
Life ins.
Extracurricular
Athletic
Dept. head/Co-or.
Sum. sch./homebound
Duration

1
3
0
1
1
1
1
2
1

1
0
2
0
0
0
0
0
0

CLINTON

DARIEN

Subtotal

11

RIDGEFIELD
Medical ins.
Dues deduction

1
0

1
1

Subtotal

1

2

WEST HAVEN
Stipulated Agreement

BETHANY
Salary
Dental ins.
Life ins.
Severance pay
Workday/year
Leaves
Curriculum

2
1
1
0
1
1
0

0
0
1
1
0
0
1

F
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Grievance
Miscellaneous

1
0

0
2

Salary
Salary scale
Medical ins*
Life ins.
Ex tracurricular
Athletic
Early retirement
Leaves
Duration

2
1
1
0
0
0
1
1
0

0
0
0
1
4
2
0
0
1

Subtotal

6

8

Salary
Medical ins.
Life ins.
Extracurricular
Athletic
Dept. head/Co-or.
Siam, sch./homebound
Assignments
Dues deduction
Miscellaneous

0
0
1
2
2
3
0
1
2
0

2
1

0
0
0
0
8
0
0
2

11

13

2
4
0
0
2
3
1
2
3
18
1
0
1

0
2
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0

Subtotal

NEWINGTON

BRANFORD

Subtotal

EAST HARTFORD
Salary
Salary scale
Medical ins.
Dental ins.
Ex tracurricular
Athletic
Dept. head/Co-or.
Sum. sch./homebound
Evaluations
Workday/year
Class size
Leaves
Duration

r
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Dues deductions
Grievance
Miscellaneous

1
12
2

0
0
3

Subtotal

53

8

0

2
2
0
0
0
0

PLYMOUTH
Salary
Salary scale
Medical ins.
Dental ins.
Ex tracurricular
Dept. head/Co-or.
Subtotal

NORTH BRANFORD
Salary
Salary scale
Medical ins.
Ex tracurricular
Athletic
Dept. head/Co-or.
Early retirement
Longevity
Workday/year
Leaves
Dues deduction
Subtotal

3
2
1

1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

15

BLOOMFIELD
Salary
Salary scale
Medical ins.
Dental ins.
Ex tracurricular
Athletic
Dept. head/Co-or.
Sum. sch./homebound
Early retirement
Longevity
Assignments
Evaluations
Workday/year
Class size

0
2
2
2
1
1
3
3
1
1
3
1
7
1

2
0
1
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
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Leaves
Reduction/recall
Duration
Dues deduction
Miscellaneous
Subtotal

1
0
0
1
1

0
1
1
0
3

31

10

NEW HAVEN
Stipulated Agreement

WALLINGFORD
Salary
Salary scale
Medical ins.
Dental ins.
Life ins.
Ex tracurricular
Athletic
Dept. head/Co-or.
Early retirement
Assignments
Evaluations
Workday/year
Class size
Leaves
Duration
Dues deduction
Grievance
Miscellaneous
Subtotal

0
4
1
1
1
0
4
2
1
0
1
2
1
3
0
3
1
4

3
1
0
1
0
2
1
0
0
2
0
0
0
2
1
0
2
1

29

15

0
0
1
0
1
1
1
3
1
1
0
9

3
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
3
2

BRIDGEPORT
Salary
Salary scale
Medical ins.
Dental ins.
Life ins.
Ex tracurricular
Athletic
Sum. sch./homebound
Early retirement
Longevity
Assignments
Workday/year

r

......
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Class size
Leaves
Reduction/recall
Dues deduction
Miscellaneous

1
1
1
0
3

0
3
0
1
1

24

16

Salary
Medical ins.
Dental ins.
Ex tracurricular
Athletic
Early retirement
Longevity

0
2
0
1
1
1
1

3
0
1
0
0
0
0

Subtotal

6

4

Salary
Medical ins.
Dental ins.
Life ins.
Athletic
Severance pay
Dept. head/Co-or.
Sum. sch./homebound
Longevity
Workday/year
Miscellaneous

1
2
0
0
1
1
1
5
1
1
1

0
0
1
1
1
0
0
1
0
0
0

14

4

Subtotal

WETHERSFIELD

HAMDEN

Subtotal

MADISON
Stipulated Agreement

STAMFORD
Salary
Medical ins.
Ex tracurricular
Dept. head/Co-or.
Sum. sch./homebound

2
0
1
2
1

0
1
1
0
0
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Longevity
Assignments
Evaluations
Workday/year
Duration

0
1
0
5
0

1
2
1
0
1

12

7

Salary
Medical ins.
Severance pay
Dept. head/Co-or.
Longevity

1
1
1
1
0

0
2
0
0
1

Subtotal

4

3

Salary

0

2

Subtotal

0

2

Salary

0

1

Subtotal

0

1

Subtotal

WOLCOTT

THOMASTON

ORANGE

ARBITRATION DECISIONS
1980 - 1981
Issue

Board

Association

NORWALK
Stipulated Agreement

BERLIN
Salary scale
Medical ins.

0
2

1
0
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Dental ins.
Life ins.
Assignments
Workday/year
Leaves
Reduction/recall
Dues deductions
Grievance
Miscellaneous

0
1
1
1
0
1
1
0
1

1
1
0
0
1
0
0
3
0

Subtotal

8

7

Dues deduction
Grievance

1
1

0
0

Subtotal

2

0

Salary
Dental ins.
Dept. head/Co-or.
Dues deduction

2
1
0
1

0
0
1
0

Subtotal

4

1

Salary
Medical ins.
Dental ins.
Life ins.
Athletic
Dep t . head/Co-or.
Early retirement
Assignments
Evaluations
Workday/year
Class size
Leaves
Reduction/recall
Miscellaneous

1
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
1
3
2
1

1
1
0
1
1
2
0
1
1
3
0
1
0
0

11

12

WATERFORD

MIDDLETOWN

SHELTON

Subtotal

r
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NORTH HAVEN
Duration

0

1

Subtotal

0

1

Salary
Medical ins.
Dental ins.
Athletic
Sum. sch./homebound
Workday/year
Class size
Leaves
Reduction/recall
Dues deduction

0
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
0

2
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1

Subtotal

9

4

Salary
Dues deduction
Grievance

0
1
1

2
0
0

Subtotal

2

2

Salary
Salary scale
Medical ins.
Dental ins.
Ex tracurricular
Athletic
Dept. head/Co-or.
Sum. sch./homebound
Workday/year
Leaves
Dues deduction
Miscellaneous

0
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
2
2
1
2

1
0
0
0
1
0
1
2
4
3
1
0

13

13

EAST HAVEN

WINDSOR LOCKS

SOUTHINGTON

Subtotal

CHESHIRE

f

^

...
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Salary
Salary scale
Medical ins.
Dental ins.
Life ins.
Extracurricular
Athletic
Sum. sch./homebound
Early retirement
Longevity
Assignments
Workday/year
Class size
Leaves
Reduction/recall
Curriculum
Duration
Dues deduction
Grievance
Miscellaneous
Subtotal

0
1
2
1
2
2
1
2
2
2
2
3
1
5
1
1
0
0
1
3

3
1
2
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
4
0
0
1
1
0
2

30

17

NEW MILFORD
Salary
Dept. head/Co-or.
Dues deduction

1
1
0

1
0
1

Subtotal

2

2

WINDHAM
Stipulated Agreement

SIMSBURY
Salary
Salary scale
Medical ins.
Dental ins.
Ex tracurricular
Athletic
Sum. sch./homebound
Early retirement
Workday/year
Class size
Reduction/recall
Duration

1
4
0
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
0
1

0
1
2
1
0
1
1
0
0
0
1
0
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Dues deduction
Miscellaneous
Subtotal

0
0

1
2

12

10

KILLINGLY
Salary
Dental ins.
Ex tracurricular
Dept. head/Co-or.
Sum. sch./homebound
Workday/year
Class size
Leaves
Dues deduction
Grievance
Miscellaneous

0
1
2
1
0
1
1
3
0
1
2

2
0
0
0
1
0
0
3
1
0
2

12

9

Salary
Salary scale
Medical ins.
Ex tracurricular
Athletic
Sum. sch./homebound
Early retirement

1
1
1
0
1
0
1

0
0
0
1
0
1
0

Subtotal

5

2

Reduction/recall
Dues deduction

1
0

0
1

Subtotal

1

1

Workday/year
Dues deduction

0
1

1
0

Subtotal

1

1

Subtotal

LITCHFIELD

BLOOMFIELD

EAST HADDAM
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HADDAM KILLINGWORTH
Stipulated Agreement

AMITY
1
0

0
1

Salary scale

0

1

Subtotal

0

1

Salary
Duration

1
1

0
0

Salary
Dept. head/Co-or.
Subtotal

REGIONAL DISTRICT tl3

GLASTONBURY

0

Subtotal

ORANGE
Salary
Salary scale
Medical ins.

0
0
1

1
1

Subtotal

BRANFORD
1

Salary
Subtotal

0

1

ANSONIA
Stipulated Agreement
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ARBITRATION DECISIONS
1981 - 1982
Town

Issue

Board

Association

STRATFORD
Stipulated Agreement

HESTON
Stipulated Agreement

WOODBRIDGE
Salary
Salary scale
Sum. sch./homebound
Evaluations
Leaves
Reduction/recall
Dues deduction

2
0
0
0
1
0
0

0
1
1
1
0
1
1

Subtotal

3

5

Salary
Ex tracurricular
Athletic
Dept. head/Co-or.
Longevity

1
0
1
0
0

0
1
0
1
1

Subtotal

2

3

Salary

0

2

Subtotal

0

2

MERIDEN

MILFORD

GUILFORD
Stipulated Agreement
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WILTON
Stipulated Agreement

PLAINVILLE
Medical ins.
Dental ins.
Life ins.
Extracurricular
Athletic
- Depti head/Co-or.
Sum. sch./homebound
Longevity
Curriculum
Miscellaneous
Subtotal

1
0
1
1
1
3
1
1
1
0

3
1
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
1

10

7

MANCHESTER
Salary
Dental ins.
Dues deduction

0
1
0

2
0
1

Subtotal

1

3

Salary
Medical ins.
Life ins.
Severance pay
Workday/year
Leaves
Reduction/recall
Duration
Dues deduction
Miscellaneous

0
1
0
0
0
2
1
0
0
1

2
1
1
1
1
0
0
1
1
0

Subtotal

5

8

BRANFORD

MONROE
Stipulated Agreement

f

:

'....
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REDDING
Salary
Salary scale
Dental ins.
Athletic
Sum. sch./homebound
Duration
Miscellaneous

0
1
1
0
0
1
1

3
0
0
3
1
0
1

Subtotal

4

8

Salary

0

1

Subtotal

0

1

Sum. sch./homebound
Assignments
Evaluations
Leaves
Reduction/recall
Dues deduction
Miscellaneous

1
2
0
1
0
0
4

0
1
2
0
8
2
2

Subtotal

8

15

Salary

1

0

Subtotal

1

0

Salary
Ex tracurricular
Workday/year

0
2
1

2
0
2

NEWTOWN

DARIEN

ENFIELD

GRISWOLD

Subtotal

TORRINGTON
Salary

0
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Medical ins.
Ex tracurricular
Athletic
Severance pay
Dept. head/Co-or,
Assignments
Workday/year
Reduction/recall
Duration
Dues deduction
Miscellaneous

0
0
1

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0

10

4

0
5
1
1
2
0

1
0
0
0
3
1

0
1
1

1
0
0

0
2
2

1
2
0

Class size

1

0

Subtotal

1

0

Subtotal

SOMERS
Salary
Medical ins.
Dental ins.
Workday/year
Leaves
Dues deduction
Subtotal

WELLINGTON
Salary
Medical ins,
Dental ins.
Subtotal

NEWINGTON
Salary
Workday/year
Miscellaneous
Subtotal

ELLINGTON
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EAST WINDSOR
Salary
Medical ins.
Dental ins.
Life ins.
Ex tracurricular
Reduction/recall
Duration

2
1
1
1
1
0
0

0
1
0
0
0
2
1

Subtotal

6

4

NEW HAVEN
Stipulated Agreement

SUFFIELD
Salary

0

2

Subtotal

0

2

Salary
Medical ins.
Longevity
Duration

2
2
0
1

0
0
1
0

Subtotal

5

1

Medical ins.
Workday/year
Leaves
Dues deduction
Miscellaneous

1
3
0
1
1

0
0
5
1
0

Subtotal

6

6

Salary
Dept. head/Co-or.
Sum. sch./homebound

0
2
1

1
0
0

WATERTOWN

NAUGATUCK

JOEL BARLOW
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Subtotal

1

3

HARTFORD
Stipulated Agreement

WATERBURY
Ex tracurricular
Leaves
Dues deduction
Miscellaneous

0
1
0
1

1
2
1
1

Subtotal

2

5

Class size
Leaves
Dues deduction

1
1
0

0
0
2

Subtotal

2

2

REGION #16

ANSONIA
Stipulated Agreement

ARBITRATION DECISIONS
1982 - 1983
Issue

Board

Association

SEYMOUR
Stipulated Agreement

NORWALK
Salary
Salary scale
Medical ins.
Dental ins.
Life ins.

0
1
2
0
0

2
0
0
2
1
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1
0
1

Ex tracurricular
Severance pay
Sum. sch./homebound

1
I
1

Subtotal

6

Salary

0

3

Subtotal

0

3

Salary
Salary scale
Medical ins.
Dental ins.
Life ins.
Extracurricular
Sum. sch./homebound
Early retirement
Longevi ty
Workday/year

0
8
4
1
1
0
1
1
1
1

1
6
2
0
0
1
0
0
0
0

18

10

1
0
0
0
1
1
2
0
4
1
2
0

0
1
1
1
0
1
2
1
4
0
0
2

12

13

TRUMBALL

BROOKFIELD

Subtotal

SHELTON
Salary
Salary scale
Medical ins.
Dental ins.
Life ins.
Dept. head/Co-or.
Early retirement
Longevity
Workday/year
Class size
Leaves
Miscellaneous
Subtotal

EAST HAVEN
Salary
Salary scale

1
0

I
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Dental ins.
Extracurricular
Athletic
Severance pay
Early retirement
Assignments
Workday/year
Class size
Leaves
Reduction/recall
Duration
Grievance
Miscellaneous
Subtotal

1
0
1
1
1
0
5
1
2
1
0
0
1

0
1
1
0
0
1
3
0
7
3
1
1
1

15

20

MERIDEN
Salary
Dues deduction

0
1

Subtotal

1

NEW MILFORD
Salary
Extracurricular
Athletic
Dept. head/Co-or.
Sum. sch./homebound
Workday/year

2
1/2
1/2
1
2
0

0
0
0
2
3
2

Subtotal

6

7

Salary
Salary scale
Medical ins.
Dental ins.

0
0
0
0

2
2
2
1

Subtotal

0

7

0
0
1

1
1
0

MADISON

NORTH STONINGTON
Salary
Salary scale
Duration
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Subtotal

PLAHSVILLE
Salary
Medical ins.
Extracurricular
Workday/year
Leaves
Reduction/recall
Dues deduction

0
1
1
3
0
0
0

2
2
0
2
1
1
1

Subtotal

5

9

Salary
Medical ins.
Dental ins.
Life ins.
Ex tracurricular
Athletic
Dept. head/Co-or.
Sum. sch./homebound
Assignments
Workday/year
Miscellaneous

0
1
0
1
1
1
1
2
0
1
1

2
4
1
0
0
1
0
0
2
0
0

Subtotal

9

10

DANBURY

WOODSTOCK ACADEMY
Stipulated Agreement

EASTON
Stipulated Agreement

DERBY
Grievance

0

1

Subtotal

0

1

WOODSTOCK
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Salary
Medical ins.
Longevity
Dues deduction

1
1
1
0

1
0
0
1

Subtotal

3

2

VERNON
Salary
Salary scale
Medical ins.
Dental ins.
Life ins.
Athletic
Longevi ty
Leaves
Reduction/recall
Duration
Dues deduction
Miscellaneous

0
0
2
1
1
0
1
1
1
0
0
2

Subtotal

9

2
2
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
1
0
8

NEW CANAAN
Stipulated Agreement

CLINTON
Salary
Workday/year
Leaves
Miscellaneous

0
2
1
1

2
0
0
0

Subtotal

4

2

0
1
1
1/2
1
1/2
1
1

1
0
0
0
1
0
0
0

CANTON
Salary
Medical ins.
Dental ins.
Extracurricular
Athletic
Dept. head/Co-or.
Early retirement
Leaves

r
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Miscellaneous

1

0

1
7
3
3
2
3
1
1
2
3
1

2
2
0
0
1
1

Subtotal

BRIDGEPORT
Salary
Medical ins.
Dental ins.
Ex tracurricular
Athletic
Sum. sch./homebound
Longevi ty
Evaluations
Workday/year
Class size
Miscellaneous
Subtotal

27

2
0
2
0
3
14

COOPERATIVE SPECIAL SERVICES CENTER
Stipulated Agreement

WILTON
Salary

0

2

Subtotal

0

2

EAST HARTFORD
Stipulated Agreement

RIDGEFIELD
Salary
Salary scale
Medical ins.
Dental ins.
Life ins.
Dept. head/Co-or.
Early retirement
Longevity
Workday/year
Class size
Leaves

r

1
0
3
1
1
4
1
1
1
3
0

2
1
6
3
0
0
0
1
0
0
4

"■
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Reduction/recall
Grievance
Miscellaneous
Subtotal

4
0
1

2
2
0

21

21

WINDHAM
Salary

0

1

Subtotal

0

1

0
1
6
2
1/2
1/2

1
0
1
0
0
0

10

2

Salary

0

1

Subtotal

0

1

Salary
Salary scale
Medical ins.
Dental ins.
Early retirement
Reduction/recall
Duration
Grievance

0
2
1
1
0
2
1
1

2
0
0
0
1
1
0
0

Subtotal

8

4

SOMERS
Salary
Salary scale
Medical ins.
Dental ins.
Extracurricular
Athletic
Subtotal

COLCHESTER

WETHERSFIELD

GUILFORD
Stipulated Agreement

f

'
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EAST HADDAM
Stipulated Agreement

BLOOMFIELD
Salary
Salary scale
Extracurricular
Athletic
Sum. sch./homebound
Early retirement
Longevity
Evaluations
Workday/year
Reduction/recall
Grievance
Miscellaneous

0
2
2
2
1
1
2
2
2
1
1
6

2
0
0
0
3
0
0
0
2
0
2
2

21

11

Salary
Dental ins.
Life ins.
Early retirement
Dues deduction
Grievance

1
0
2
1
0
1

1
2
0
0
1
1

Subtotal

5

5

Salary
Salary scale
Medical ins.
Dept. head/Co-or.
Workday/year
Dues deduction
Miscellaneous

2
0
0
1
1
2
2

0
1
1
0
0
0
0

Subtotal

8

2

0
0

1
1-1/2

Subtotal

NORWICH FREE ACADEMY

AVON

HADDAM - KILLINGWORTH
Salary
Medical ins.

F
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Dental ins.
Workday/year

0
1

1/2
0

Subtotal

1

3

Salary
Salary scale
Medical ins.
Extracurricular
Athletic
Dept. head/Co-or.
Sum. sch./homebound
Longevity
Assignments
Workday/year
Leaves
Reduction/recall
Grievance
Miscellaneous

2
1
3
11
1
6
1
1
1
2
3
3
0
4

2
0
4
0
2
1
1
0
1
2
2
8
1
3

Subtotal

39

27

Salary
Extracurricular
Athletic

0
1/2
1/2

1
0
0

1

1

JOEL BARLOW

WOLCOTT

Subtotal

ARBITRATION DECISIONS
1983 - 1984
Town

Issue

Board

Association

MERIDEN
Medical ins.

0

1

Subtotal

0

1

BERLIN

r
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Salary
Salary scale
Medical ins.
Dental ins.
Extracurricular
Workday/year
Leaves
Reduction/recall
Duration
Dues deduction
Grievance
Miscellaneous
Subtotal

0
0
0
1
3
2
2
0
0
1
0
3

3
4
1
0
0
0
1
1
1
0
1
0

12

12

0
2
4
1
1
0
1
1
2

2
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0

STRATFORD
Salary
Medical ins.
Dental ins.
Life ins.
Longevity
Workd ay/year
Class size
Curriculum
Miscellaneous
Subtotal

12

BROOKFIELD
Stipulated Agreement

MILFORD
Stipulated Agreement

NORTH STONINGTON
Salary scale

0

1

Subtotal

0

1

NAUGATUCK
Salary
Medical ins.

f

r

0
1

2
0

_.
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Ex tracurricular
Athletic

2
2

0
0

Subtotal

DANBURY
Salary

0

2

Subtotal

0

2

NORTH HAVEN
Stipulated Agreement

NEW MILFORD
Salary
Salary scale
Extracurricular
Dept. head/Co-or.
Sum. sch./homebound
Early retirement
Longevity
Workday/year
Leaves

2
0
0
1
0
1
1
3
1

0
1
1
3
4
0
0
1
0

Subtotal

9

10

NEW BRITAIN
Stipulated Agreement

EAST WINDSOR
Salary
Extracurricular
Dept. head/Co-or.
Miscellaneous

0
1
1
2

2
0
0
0

Subtotal

4

2

Salary
Medical ins.

2
0

0
2

MANCHESTER
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Subtotal

BRANFORD
Salary
Salary scale
Ex tracurricular
Athletic
Dept. head/Co-or.
Sum. sch./homebound
Longevity

0
0
2
1
6
3
2

6
2
0
0
0
0
0

14

8

Salary

0

2

Subtotal

0

2

Subtotal

COLEBROOK

WINDHAM
Stipulated Agreement

FAIRFIELD
Salary
Leaves
Miscellaneous

0
1
0

2
0
1

Subtotal

1

3

Workday/year

6

6

Subtotal

6

6

Salary
Salary scale
Medical ins.
Extracurricular
Athletic

0
1
0
2
1

2
0
2
0
0

NORTH BRANDORD

TORRINGTON
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Severance pay
Evaluations
Workday/year
Miscellaneous

1
0
1
0

0
1
0
1

Subtotal

6

6

Salary
Ex tracurricular
Miscellaneous

0
1
0

1
0
2

Subtotal

1

3

SUFFIELD

NORWICH
Stipulated Agreement

NEW HAVEN
Stipulated Agreement

WOLCOTT

~
Salary
Salary scale
Medical ins.
Ex tracurricular
Athletic
Dept. head/Co-or.
Assignments
Workday/year
Duration
Mi scellaneous
Subtotal

3
0
1
1
1
1
2
3
1
1

0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1

14

2

ARBITRATION DECISIONS
1984 - 1985
Town

Issue

Board

Association

NORWALK
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Stipulated Agreement

MERIDEN
Salary scale
Extracurricular
Athletic

1
0
0

0
1
1

Subtotal

1

2

Salary
Medical ins.

0
2

1
0

Subtotal

2

1

0
3
1
1

2
1

MADISON

CLINTON
Salary
Salary scale
Longevity
Workday/year

0
1
4

Subtotal

SOUTHINGTON
Stipulated Agreement

EAST HARTFORD
Stipulated Agreement

WILTON
Stipulated Agreement

CHESHIRE
Salary
Medical ins.
Assignments
Workday/year

r

0
4
1
0

2
1
0
3

:
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Miscellaneous

0

1

Subtotal

5

7

Salary
Salary scale
Medical ins.
Dental ins.
Life ins.
Early retirement
Longevi ty
Workday/year
Dues deduction
Miscellaneous

0
0
2
0
1
2
0
1
0
1

4
2
3
1
0
0
2
1
2
0

Subtotal

7

15

HEW CANAAN

KILLINGLY
Stipulated Agreement

SHARED SERVICES
Stipulated Agreement

THOMASTON
Salary scale
Longevity
Assignments
VJorkday/year
Leaves
Dues deductions
Miscellaneous
Subtotal

1
1
4
2
0
0
6

0
0
0
2
1
1
2

14

6

OLD SAYBROOK
Salary

0

1

Subtotal

0

1
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BARKHAMSTED
2
0
1

0
1
0

Salary

0

1

Subtotal

0

1

Salary
Medical ins.
Ex tracurricular
Athletic
Sum. sch./homebound
Early retirement
Longevity
Workday/year
Miscellaneous

0
0
0
0
0
0
1
3
1

0
1
0

Subtotal

5

8

Salary
Medical ins.
Dental ins.
Duration

1
3
0
0

2
7
2
1

Salary
Dental ins.
Longevity
Subtotal

NEW BRITAIN

WINCHESTER

DARIEN

12

Subtotal

EAST HAMPTON
Stipulated Agreement

CO-OPERATIVE SPECIAL SERVICES CENTER
Evaluations
Workday/year

0
0

Subtotal

0

1
2
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WETHERSFIELD
Salary
Medical ins.
Dental ins.
Life ins.
Early retirement
Assignments
Workday/year
Class size
Reduction and recall
Duration

1
1
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
0

0
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
1

0
1
1

1
0
1

Subtotal

GUILFORD
Salary
Salary scale
Dept. head/Co-or,

2

Subtotal

SUFFIELD
Salary
Salary scale
Athletic
Dept, head/Co-or.

0
2
2
1

2
1
1
0

Subtotal

HARTFORD
Stipulated Agreement

OXFORD
Salary scale

0

2

Subtotal

0

2

Salary

0

WATERBURY
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Salary scale
Ex tracurricular
Early retirement
Longevity
Evaluations
Workday/year
Class size
Leaves
Reduction/recall
Miscellaneous

1
0
4
1
0
8
10
4
1
3

1
2
0
0
1
0
1
1
1
6

Subtotal

32

16

Salary

0

3

Subtotal

0

3

Salary

0

1

Subtotal

0

1

NORWICH FREE ACADEMY

MONTVILLE

ANSONIA
Stipulated Agreement

f

r
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